Afghanistan: defeat by the Taliban is a debacle for the West

Put it any way,  this is a debacle. British and American troops are flying into Kabul only to fly out as many of their fellow citizens and dependants as they can – in short order. The American Embassy is to be relocated to Kabul airport, where no doubt it will be folded up like an Ikea flatpack and flown out in a few weeks’ time. It’s a fitting metaphor for Joe Biden’s attitude to the Afghan story – to which he seems never to have been seriously committed in the first place.

The Taliban summer lightning campaign is now reaching its culminating point. Only one or two key outlying capitals remain out of their clutches – such as Jalalabad and Mazar e Sharif – but they could go by the weekend.

The signs of the siege of Kabul beginning are unmistakable. The refugees are already swelling the bloated populations of the shanty towns and the tent settlements of the outskirts. Food is scarce and the countryside is being hit by yet another terrible drought. The pervasive sense of desperation and despair are ingredients for yet further cycles of insurrection and violence with which the Taliban will have to cope in the months, and possibly years to come.

The collapse is now accelerating – as it nearly always does in guerrilla war. It is going to be hard for President Ashraf Ghani and his forces to hang on.

The Taliban’s diplomatic leadership protests that the Kabul government has broken faith on their agreements in Doha by counter-attacking. The Taliban, the diplomatic leaders complain, are only after a peaceful settlement.

The brutal facts on the ground, the decapitations, assassinations and suicide bombers, say different. This looks like a well-planned and successfully executed campaign plan, probably drawn up the minute the US agreed to quit Afghan territory, at the Doha talks eighteen months ago.

It is a classic example of modern guerrilla tactics – the essence of the new ‘wars among the people’ brilliantly depicted by Rupert Smith and the Israeli Martin Van Creveld in their two standard texts, “The Utility of Force” and “The Transformation of War.” These campaigns are open-ended and not restricted by a timetable. They work through populations, rather than against them. Tactics in the field are ‘sub-sophisticated’ – not fancy aircraft and artillery, though the Taliban do appear to have drones. The classic weaponry is the IED – improvised explosive device, or remotely triggered primitive bomb (costing $10 or less in Helmand), and the suicide vest.

A lot hinges on human intelligence, subversion and betrayal. Kabul is a free-fire zone for informers and sleeper agents.

Behind all this there is some agile and very capable tactical thinking – establishing a simple but effective scheme of manoeuvre. The campaign opened with taking out northern towns and main border crossings. Next up were the provincial capitals in ascending order of importance starting with Kunduz. Overnight before this weekend, we heard of the fall of Lashkar Gah , Herat and Kandahar, all three strategic lynchpins. 

Lashkar Gah is the hub of the Helmand drugs industry – with that one province growing around half of Afghanistan’s opium crop. Herat holds the gateway to Iran and is a distinct political culture – making it all the surprising that Ismail Khan, local warlord of legend, was pushed aside so easily. Kandahar is the spiritual home of Taliban in its current incarnation; it was born there in the early 90s under the leadership of the charismatic, one-eyed and semi-literate Mullah Mohammed Omar.

The sweep across the capitals suggest that Kabul is next – and may well fall in a week or so. The planning has the marks of the known collaborators and sympathisers in the Pakistan forces, the Inter Services Intelligence agency especially.

Once in control in Kabul, there will be new problems for the Taliban. They will have to maintain discipline, and manage resupplies for their forces. The allies from militant groups now establishing themselves on Taliban coat-tails – Al Qaeda , Islamic State and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to name but three – could become a threat to the Taliban’s Pashtu nationalist command. Experts such as Rory Stewart and Jytte Klausen, who majors on European jihadism at Brandeis, suggest these groups are already posing a renewed threat to Northern Europe and the US.

It will be no groundhog day for the New Taliban regime – they won’t be able to take on where they left off when they were kicked out of Kabul in November 2001.

There has been a huge growth in literacy – with millions of girls going to school, a computer – literate youth, and connectivity through mobile phone networks that cover more than 80% of the country. What will the New Taliban demagogues do? They might be tempted to blow up the transmitters and transponders – but your average Talib loves his mobile as much as any other Afghan citizen.

The major growth industry is in drugs – which now account for about 60% of Afghanistan’s economy, possibly more. With it has come spectacular increases in the number of home-based addicts, which is a huge problem for neighbouring Iran as well. At least five million are acknowledged, official addicts – but up to a third of the 40 million population are heavy users – not only heroin but heavy forms of cannabis such as Skunk, and synthetic narcotics are being traded. In 2000, the old Taliban banned opium trade – the only time in recent record a band succeeded. The New Taliban are unlikely to do be willing or able to pull off the same trick again.

Uncoiling the whole messy saga of international operations in Afghanistan since October 2001 will be unpleasant, but very necessary. The confusion of policy making, planning and strategy has to be investigated further if we are to have any chance of establishing a strategy and doctrine for Britain and the world. 

There is optimism of diplomats and civil servants and the pessimism of the soldiers, and hubris of politicians such as Tony Blair and Donald Rumsfeld. We haven’t heard or seen yet half of what now needs to be aired. A short, sharp investigation is needed – and probably it would come better from the much-maligned media than some vested interest in government, Whitehall and the armed services.

The media is now a vital entity in Afghanistan, which has seen a growth in free and open broadcasting and printed journalism in the last two decades. Over one thousand women are top ranked journalists on radio, tv, and the press. They are already being targeted by the Taliban. In the New York Times, the great Ahmed Rashid and Jeanne Bourgault explain why these exemplary young journalists need to be protected – and urgently.

Anyone interested in press freedoms and civic liberties should do the utmost to help. Anyone believing in freedom and fairness, truth and trust, should be concerned about what is unfolding in Afghanistan.