Nationalists and republicans in Ireland are predisposed to believe that an independent, 32-county Irish state is inevitable. Since Northern Ireland was created, in 1921, they’ve remained convinced that the region’s existence will be short-lived and they will soon attain their goal. This sense of historical destiny has its peaks and troughs, but it’s a constant factor in politics north and south of the border.
The UK’s decision to leave the EU is just the latest development to generate excited speculation about the likely effects of a ‘border poll’ on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Separatists are keen to encourage the idea that, because a majority in the province voted remain, a significant number of former unionists would support an all-Ireland state, in order to retain links with Brussels.
It’s an argument that appeals, not just to Irish nationalists, whose biases it seems to confirm, but also to British ultra-remainers, who feel vindicated in their claims that Brexit put the integrity of the UK at risk.
The EU-centric website, Politico Europe, last week reported breathlessly that “momentum” is gathering “on both sides of the border for the reunification of the island”. In a feature length article, it strung together crude demographic arguments, wild conjecture and quotes, many gathered from people who made it their business to create noisy chatter around Irish ‘unity’, long before the average elector had heard of ‘Brexit’.
Certainly, it would be wrong (and rather complacent) to deny that the EU referendum result has produced uncertainty in Northern Ireland. The outcome disrupted settled relationships between London and Dublin, hastened the collapse of power-sharing and made issues around sovereignty and identity less easy to ignore.
As Brexit negotiations have progressed, the British side has been assiduous in its attempts to avoid aggravating Irish sensibilities. Theresa May and her government have made repeated assurances that the frontier will not be hardened in any way, going so far as to support an amendment to the Withdrawal Bill that added a legal commitment to avoid physical infrastructure.
In contrast, the European Commission has used the border and nationalist sentiment as key components of its negotiating strategy, striving to create fear, ramp up emotions and bind British negotiators.
This opportunism contributes to the sense that Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom is in doubt, but the direct challenge of a border poll and absorption by the Republic of Ireland is a less immediate threat than attempts to dilute its links with Great Britain. Dublin and Brussels insist that Ulster must stay in the single market and customs union, even while the rest of the UK leaves, with the result that border checks would be required in the Irish Sea.
The Politico article alludes to various recent polls that have tested attitudes to Brexit, identity and sovereignty, both on the island of Ireland and in Great Britain. Though some of the results have been worrying for unionists, their findings vary, and none has shown a majority or even a plurality that supports a new, 32-county Irish state.
Indeed, a recent survey commissioned by Lord Ashcroft, that created a particular stir among nationalists, showed that while there is sympathy in southern Ireland for the principle of an all-island republic, there is also scepticism about whether it is desirable or affordable in the foreseeable future. That poll showed support for the UK at 49 per cent and support for a ‘united Ireland’ at 44 per cent, but one month previously, a Queen’s University poll showed just 21.1% backing for a 32 county state and Policy Exchange reported similar results.
The nationalist arguments for an all-Ireland republic, and the articles that repeat them, resort to emotion, as well as hazy ideas about ‘context’ and identity, in order to fill holes where no detail or facts exist.
The Belfast Agreement contains only incidental references to the EU, but we’re told repeatedly that joint membership underpinned the peace process. There is no suggestion that the ‘common travel area’, that allows people to move across the British Isles without checks, will be affected by Brexit, yet you’d be forgiven for thinking that Irish farmers will be frisked in their own yards. Politico cites a strong performance by Sinn Fein in last year’s Assembly election, but ignores the DUP’s resurgence in the Westminster election, 3 months later.
While it contends that Brexit will disrupt business in Ireland, no attention is devoted to the economic turmoil that would follow the creation of a new state. Northern Ireland is one of the poorer regions of the UK. It receives a transfer of about £10 billion per year from the Exchequer. The only serious nationalist plan to replace this money, without causing sudden, excruciating hardship, is that London should keep paying for its former territory, decades after it’s been absorbed by the Republic.
When the pro-republican journalist, Paul Gosling, wrote a case for Irish ‘unity’ called ‘The Economic Impact of an All Island Economy’, he proposed massively reducing public sector employment in Northern Ireland. While there’s been a longstanding case for tackling the province’s dependence on government money, the University of Ulster economist, Dr Esmond Birnie, points out that Gosling’s plan would involve quickly laying off 50,000 people. Rather than a gradual rebalancing from the public to the private sector in Northern Ireland, this scheme would “be a shattering blow” to both.
Dr Edgar Morgenroth, from Ireland’s Economic and Social Research Institute, estimates that Ulster’s proportion of the UK’s public sector pension liability could “more than double” the Republic’s current liabilities. That’s not to mention the province’s share of Britain’s national debt, which may amount to €64 billion. He believes that Irish people can expect an 11% drop in GDP per capita, as their dividend for an all-island state.
These are the hard, economic facts that frame the debate, before we even consider emotional issues like sovereignty and identity.
Nationalist terminology around ‘reunification’ is misleading because Ireland has been a united polity only under the Crown. A 32 county, independent state would be an entirely new entity, struggling from its inception to absorb a substantial British minority that feels like it has been ripped from the United Kingdom against its will.
The notion that unionists can be accommodated in an all-island republic is nonsense. The new country might have room for British people, or protestants, but unionism, as a political identity, would cease to exist. While Irish separatists can always aspire to a ‘united Ireland’, for pro-Union people in a 32 county republic, there would be no way back to the United Kingdom that they once knew.
The idea that Britain’s decision to leave the EU has made an all-Ireland state likely or inevitable is overstated and fanciful, but nationalists of various types certainly think there are new opportunities to weaken the Union by stealth.
In Northern Ireland, just like the rest of the country, there are also those who seem to hate Brexit more than anything, and they made an appearance in Lord Ashcroft’s poll. These people are, for instance, supporters of the ‘centre-ground’ Alliance Party, a plurality of whom say they would favour an all-Ireland state, if they were asked to vote tomorrow
They hate Brexit more than a border in the Irish Sea, they hate it more than the threat of their own impoverishment and they hate it more, or so they say, than the economic and social chaos that would follow the creation of a 32 county republic. The existence of this cohort means that unionists cannot be complacent and must try to appeal to voters beyond their own traditional base.
An intense debate on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future could even have benefits, for those who want to protect the province’s place in the United Kingdom. It gives them an opportunity to hone their arguments for the Union, and construct a positive case that appeals, not only to traditional unionists, who are reached already by the DUP, but also to socially liberal voters who feel alienated by Arlene Foster and her party.
