Britain must rethink its role as America’s poodle

President Biden has spelled out in the clearest terms so far his version of the “America First” policy. Closing US military operations in Afghanistan, he said the era of US military intervention is over.

“This decision about Afghanistan. It’s about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries …. Moving on from that mindset and these kinds of large-scale troop deployments will make us stronger and more effective and safer at home.”

The Biden posture presents an immediate challenge to the UK, according to senior military officers recently retired and some still serving – though the latter cannot go on the record without permission in keeping with the Queen’s Regulations.

“It is time for a major UK reset,” says General Nick Parker, former commander of the Army and the UK forces in Afghanistan. He and several like-minded officers believe it is time for the UK to rethink the role of “America’s poodle”. “In Afghanistan we were another insignificant member of a 40-member coalition – about as relevant to America as, say, Norway, in that alliance.”

Implicit in Biden’s words, according to the general and his colleagues, is the future function and viability of the Nato alliance.

Be it noted: Biden did not mention allies in his speech last night. They do not feature prominently in his vision of the reset for America. Though what this means for the huge American military machine, $700 billion defence budget, and 800 overseas bases, will now become a matter of fierce debate.

The proceedings in the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee today should be the opening of a fierce debate in the UK. Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, is presenting his and his department’s case for their conduct in the Afghan crisis before one of his own party’s most powerful critics, Lt Colonel Tom Tugendhat MP TD, a veteran of several tours in Afghanistan.

So far Raab has defended his and his team’s record, though many have been extremely critical about the organisation of visas, and above all the poor intelligence and intelligence analysis on the Taliban offensive. Now the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Sir Simon Gass, has been sent to talk to Taliban reps in Doha to get a safe passage agreement for Afghans still seeking to leave for Britain. Even if something is agreed, few give it much chance of being honoured by the cohorts of Taliban gunmen on the ground.

As Parker has spotted, there is now a shift in the Westminster bubble and among the media chaterati to blame the military. Kipling’s Mr Atkins is for it yet again. Tuesday’s Guardian led the charge – Simon Jenkins blaming so much on Blair’s messianic and militaristic hubris, and Polly Toynbee condemning the extra £16 billion committed to defence. If only it were that simple. The two Guardian gurus should read Mirjam Grandia’s outstanding “Inescapable Entrapments? The Civil – Military Decision Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand” to understand the complexity of the whole piece. Ultimate responsibility must reside with the politicians for the impossible demands they made of their forces and administrators – and for the rotten advice they often took from their pet private advisers.

Britain now needs to do a quick appraisal of what has gone wrong in its strategic, security and defence thinking. The fine words and lofty ideas of Professor John Bew’s Integrated Review should be put to one side, in favour of laying down practical priorities for policies and alliances that are needed and affordable, says Parker.

At home this means cleaning up the structure for deciding on policy and force deployments. This means first of all making the National Security Council, now more than a decade old, really work. Being National Security Adviser should require some form of specialist background and ability. It is hoped that this will come from today’s discussions at Tugendhat’s committee.

The NSA and the NSC should agree the strategy with the Prime Minister, and key ministers, which means all or some of the Foreign, Home and Defence secretaries, the Chancellor, and even the law officers. The different departments should then execute the policy with their own specialist teams.

In the Afghan crisis Boris Johnson assiduously chaired meetings of the so-called “Cobra Committee” – an ad hoc group of ministers and officials meeting in the old cabinet war rooms. Much of the business was tactical and operational – which is below the PM’s pay grade – rather than strategic, say critics.

From Cobra, orders would filter down through organisations like the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood, which in turn would deploy a tactical HQ to theatre – in this case Kabul. “I would bin PJHQ at Northwood – it isn’t needed,” says Parker. Instead the decisions should be taken by a specialist cell at the MoD.

Above this, the National Security Council and National Security Adviser should receive specialist position papers to be put before the commanders and cabinet ministers. They then give the orders to implement. The critique of former experienced commanders like Parker, and the Lords Richards and Dannatt, implies that the whole NSA mechanism needs to be far more professional.

The Adviser needs to be a professional steeped in the arts of war, peace, diplomacy, counter-insurgency and a whole set of disciplines and skills new and old. These should include the strategic impact of climate change. Ideally, it should be a partnership of a modern forward-looking soldier and an experienced strategist – of which there are precious few in both civil service and academic circles in the UK today.

An emergency reform is now needed to sort out the muddle in the civil service at the highest level, and the crisis of the hollowed out British armed forces. An experienced enforcer like Ben Wallace would have the drive to push this through. Diplomats should be ruled out, because the diplomatic service is looking less fit for purpose by the day – despite brilliant individual performances by the likes of Sir Lawrie Bristow in Kabul. A radical reform review should be launched, according to a chorus of critics, of the imagination and scale of that by the late Kate Mortimer with Lord Rothschild.

Two immediate issues lie within this reform agenda. Biden’s speech has revealed at last the simmering existential crisis for Nato – the biggest since the end of the Cold War. What is it for now – and what purpose does this enormous bureaucracy and structure serve? The founder and leader, the US, no longer seems to want to lead and its own leader doesn’t seem to rate alliances at all.

Second, there must be an inquiry, and in short order, as to what happened to the UK, its wishes, policies and aspirations, in Afghanistan – now that its forces have retreated thence for the seventh time in 180 years.