German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said today that avoiding a direct NATO-Russia military confrontation that risked nuclear war is his top priority, as he was grilled on why he is still dragging his feet over supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine.
As for Germany’s much-scrutinised refusal to impose a ban on Russian gas, the Chancellor told Der Spiegel: “I absolutely do not see how a gas embargo would end the war. If Putin were open to economic arguments, he would never have begun this crazy war.”
In late February, days after war broke out, Scholz gave a high-profile speech in which he announced a Zeitenwendem – “turning point”- in German foreign policy on defence in light of Russia’s invasion.
But now the strength of this so-called sea change – and Scholz’s true commitment to Ukraine – is coming under scrutiny.
Scholz is still vetoing the delivery of tanks, anti-ship missiles, and long-range artillery to Ukraine – a position exposing the cracks in Germany’s centre-left coalition. He is especially in the firing line of the Greens – a party in favour of delivering heavy weapons, which has tended to be warier of Moscow over the years.
Frustration at his deliberating has now morphed into accusations of downright deception. Anton Hofreiter, head of the European Committee in the Bundestag, and one of the Green party’s top politicians, has accused him of making promises of arms supplies in public while simultaneously working behind the scenes to frustrate deliveries.
Why is Scholz so hesitant to supply weapons, despite the risk of losing his majority?
In a 19 April press conference, he repeated the line that Germany would not “go it alone” without Europe – in other words, Germany would not act unilaterally, but rather in co-ordination with other NATO allies when considering supplying heavy weapons.
But this argument seems disingenuous when we consider that many NATO members have already stepped up shipments: the Czech Republic has announced it will send tanks, Slovakia S-300 long-range missile systems, and the UK, Poland and the US heavy artillery. Cynics point out that Germany’s refusal is more likely driven by a desire to avoid becoming the primary European target of a nuclear strike.
The FT’s Wolfgang Münchau has proposed a livelier explanation: “Vladimir Putin may have some kompromat on Scholz: blackmail material.”
According to Münchau, Scholz has been implicated in two financial scandals in Germany – one involving a fraudulent tax scheme during his time as mayor of Hamburg and the other being his failure to take action in the Wirecard scandal while serving as finance minister. The Kremlin has no shortage of friends in German industry and Scholz’s SDP party – could it be that he has more information on the Chancellor’s involvement?
Whatever the reason for Scholz’s hesitance, there is a historical precedent. Germany’s longstanding soft approach to Moscow is what got its president disinvited from Kyiv last week. And as Tyson Barker of the German Council on Foreign Relations puts it, “Deferred action has long been the default political setting for Germany… Plodding and iterative, Germany has preferred to ride the brakes.”