French Election Letter: Macron not alone in counting his chickens

On the morning of June 23, 2016, I was one of many who were sure that Remain and David Cameron would win the EU referendum. I was equally sure, later that year, that Hillary Clinton would beat Donald Trump to become the first female President of the United States. That’s what the polls were saying, and who was I to disagree?  So when I tell you now that Emmanuel Macron will win this Sunday’s French presidential election by something like 55 per cent of the vote to 45 per cent for his far-right opponent Marine Le Pen, you should take my prediction — that is to say, the prevailing view — with a pincée de sel. 

Because who knows? Maybe Madame Le Pen (as Macron indulgently refers to her) will wipe the smug smile off her rival’s face on Sunday night and, with the keys to the Élysée Palace safely in her purse, take France on a journey into the unknown. 

There is little doubt that a majority of French voters of all political persuasions would like to see the back of Macron, whose sporadic show of humility during the television debate with Le Pen on Wednesday night still managed to convey an innate and irritating arrogance. But, alone in the polling booth, with the curtain drawn, how many will summon up the necessary will to promote France’s answer to Trump and Viktor Orban from nuisance to nemesis?  

My guess is, not enough. It won’t happen. Probably. 

Instead, by a comfortable margin, the incumbent will carry on and, even allowing for the exigencies of war, it will be more of the same for the next five years. 

Is this a good thing for France? Well, there is little doubt that the French economy and the country’s relations with Europe and the wider world would be better served by Macron than by Le Pen. He has more experience of crisis management at the highest level than any other western leader. He also has a hide like a rhinoceros. 

The head of the National Rally party would (if she could get away with it) take France out of the command structure of Nato and, having weakened or withdrawn sanctions on Russian oil and gas, would explore ways of restoring the good name of her friend and ally Vladimir Putin. She would slash France’s contribution to the EU budget and, as early as the autumn, seek permission by way of a referendum to bring in a French Preference, or France First, law favouring “native” French over immigrants — including non-French EU citizens — in jobs, housing and benefits. 

Not so much Frexit as Wrecks-it. Europe would be in turmoil. 

At home, she would ban Muslim women from wearing the veil, or even a headscarf, in public places, expel over a thousand foreign-born Imams and shut some 170 “radical” mosques. All immigrants, whatever their origins, convicted of breaking French law or deemed to be living unlawfully off the state would be deported. To ensure the smooth operation of this policy, the police would be re-armed “both morally and physically”. 

Instead of raising the state-backed retirement age from 62 to 64 or 65, as Macron has promised, Le Pen would reinforce the existing 40-year rule so that anyone who started work straight after leaving school could retire at 57. Young people up to the age of 30 would be exempt from income tax. The minimum wage would increase significantly, as would pensions. VAT would be removed entirely from a range of household items, while the tax levied on energy bills would come down from 20 per cent to 5.5 per cent 

Where the money would come from to pay for such an all-encompassing programme remains something of a mystery. The rich and big corporations would presumably play their part, and US tech companies, we are told, would be required to pay tax on their digital earnings in France outside of any scheme approved by the EU or OECD. 

In short, France under Le Pen would become a rogue state, slyly cosying up to Russia while spurning the EU and Nato and declaring war on immigrants. 

If there is a caveat to be entered amid all of the above, it comes from the unavoidable chasm between what has been promised and what could realistically be achieved. The new President would, for a start, need the support of a majority in the National Assembly, elections too, which take place in June. And as things stand, no one can tell how those elections will go. 

Le Pen’s main populist rival, Jean Luc Mélenchon, leader of the far-left France Unbowed party, appears to believe that after his strong performance in the first round of the presidentials (when he won 23.1 per cent of the vote against 23.15 per cent for Le Pen), he could yet end up as prime minister at the head of the largest parliamentary party.

Melénchon might, through gritted teeth, endorse parts of Le Pen’s economic programme and, like her, favours a loosening of ties to both Europe and the Alliance. But he would draw the line at France First, with its strong nativist tenor and would have no truck with the mass deportation of immigrants.  

More to the point, where, without a powerful representation in the assembly, would Le Pen find her ministers?  Not all members of the Council of State have to have been elected as deputies (giving up their seats to party alternates — suppléants — after joining the government), but in practice almost all are. 

The French parliament is a strange beast, with a multiplicity of parties reflecting every possible splinter group as well as independents. En Marche won a resounding victory in 2017, but the National Rally is not expected to replicate that performance and a broad antifa front would both constrain Le Pen’s choice of ministers and force her to water down her most controversial measures. It could even make it impossible for her to govern, leading to a constitutional crisis.

The alternative to all this, as indicated by the pollsters, is, of course, that the man already in place wins a second term, not by a landslide but by a sufficient margin to put the Far-Right back in its box at least until 2027, at which point, sans Macron, all bets will be off. 

Should this be the case, the “President of the Rich” is expected to tack ever so slightly to the left in the hope of maximising his support in the Assembly in June and winning over at least some of those who see him as an out of touch élitist. Expect a distinct mellowing of tone, if not of actual policy. Expect, too, increased kow-towing to the Assembly, where a fall in En Marche numbers could force a form of coalition government, or, as the French put it, cohabitation. 

Pension reform, economic management and the European Project will be the items highest on the upcoming second-term agenda along — inevitably — with all the problems thrown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not least the energy crisis and runaway inflation. But even as he accepts the salutes of the Republican Guard and proceeds upstairs to his office in the Élysée, Macron will be mindful of the weekends to come when, in an ongoing Round Three of the presidentials, the malcontents of Paris and beyond take once more to the streets.