Germany under fire for not doing enough to help Ukraine

Germany’s coalition government is divided over whether to send heavy weaponry to Ukraine, with Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz at odds with the Greens and liberal FDP, who are in favour of giving the green light to the shipments. 

Scholz defended his decision not to export tanks and armoured personnel carriers to Kyiv in a speech on Tuesday, saying that Germany would not “go it alone” and that decisions would be made in close coordination with “friends and allies”.

It raises the question: Is Germany now doing enough to help Ukraine? 

Berlin has participated in EU-wide sanctions against Russia, as well as undergoing some considerable policy shifts in solidarity with Ukraine. But it has also come under fire, both for funding Putin’s war through its continual hefty purchases of Russian energy, and for its reluctance to supply heavy weaponry to Kyiv. 

What exactly has Berlin offered so far in terms of military aid and energy sanctions, where is it falling short and what should we make of the Bundestag’s efforts so far? Here’s what you need to know.

What military aid has Germany offered and where has it fallen short? 

The conflict in Ukraine has triggered a dramatic U-turn in Germany’s position on military aid. 

Germany had a longstanding practice of blocking all lethal weapons from being sent to conflict zones. Yet within two days of Putin’s invasion, Berlin announced it would send 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft defence systems from its own stockpile to Kyiv. 

It has since allocated significant amounts of military aid to Ukraine. On 15 April, finance minister Christian Lindner announced that Germany will increase its foreign military aid to €2 billion, of which a large share – at least €1 billion – will go to Ukraine to help it purchase weapons. This increase will be part of the supplementary budget for this year. Last year, Germany’s total foreign military aid fund was just €225 million. 

Berlin’s reformed stance on sending lethal weapons abroad has facilitated other European countries’ support for Ukraine, since large portions of the continent’s weapons and ammunition are German-manufactured, giving Berlin legal control over their transfer. Before, Estonia had complained that it wanted to send (German-made) old howitzers to Ukraine but Berlin blocked it from doing so. 

Germany has now sent grenades, anti-aircraft rockets, machine guns and ammunition to Kyiv.

But Scholz’s decision not to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons has prompted complaints from Kyiv and disagreement within Germany’s centre-left, three-party ruling coalition. While Scholz has argued that such deliveries would only be possible in coordination with NATO, members of the Greens and the liberal FDP – who support shipments of heavy weapons – point out that other EU governments such as the Czechs are already delivering tanks. 

What about energy sanctions? 

The first dramatic move taken by Scholz in the wake of Putin’s invasion was to pull the plug on the $12 billion Nord Stream 2 pipeline, built to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany.

Since then, Germany – alongside other EU members – has agreed to a ban on Russian coal, effective from August. But Berlin has rejected any immediate embargo on Russian oil or gas, committing instead to stop buying Russian oil by the end of the year. Berlin has also committed to ending most Russian gas imports by mid-2024. 

Germany is in a sticky position since roughly half of its gas and coal imports, and about one third of its oil imports, originate from Russia. Robert Habeck, the country’s economy minister, has warned that cutting off Russian energy risks sparking social unrest in Germany. 

On Monday, Germany’s trade unions also issued a joint statement opposing an immediate ban on Russian natural gas, warning of the resulting “shutdowns, further de-industrialization and long-term loss of work positions in Germany.”

What do other countries make of Germany’s support for Ukraine? 

After Boris Johnson met Scholz in London, he commended his German counterpart for the “seismic decisions” he has already taken “to move Germany away from Russian hydrocarbons,” adding: “We cannot transform our respective energy systems overnight.” 

Other leaders have been less polite. Mateusz Morawiecki, the prime minister of Poland, this week accused Germany of “standing in the way” of harsher sanctions against Russia, telling reporters: “Anyone who reads the notes of EU meetings knows that Germany is the biggest impediment when it comes to more decisive sanctions.”

According to an ARD poll from 7 April, 45% of the German public also believe their government is not going far enough to help Ukrainians in light of Russia’s attack – an 18% increase since March. Half of those surveyed are in favour of blocking imports of Russian gas, despite the impact it could have on their ability to heat their own homes. 

Polling has also revealed that a majority of the German public is in favour of temporarily increasing the lifespan of coal-fired plants and making nuclear power plants operational again, if it meant reducing reliance on Russian energy. Yet as a leader Green Party member, Habeck has advocated for years for the abolition of coal-fired plants and the scrapping of nuclear power plants.

Cases are emerging of members of the German public finding ways to increase support for Ukraine. On 12 April, Rheinmetall, a German arms giant, announced it is prepared to refurbish and send up to 50 Leopard 1 tanks to Ukraine, as well as offering to train Ukrainian tank crews. 

Armin Papperger, the company’s CEO, told the Handelsblatt newspaper that the first tank could be delivered in six weeks if the Bundestag gives its approval. While this is a private offer from an individual company, a deal of this size would still need the approval of the German parliament.