Greek-French mutual defence pact sets sights on Turkey

I’ll see your AUKUS and raise you GREEF. There’s no acronym yet for the Greek/French defence pact recently ratified by the parliament in Athens, so GREEF may have to suffice. To this alphabet soup must be added a dash of MDCA and a diluted portion of NATO.

First AUKUS. The Australian/UK/US submarine deal made the headlines and brought into focus how the security architecture of the 21^st century is being constructed. GREEF, on the other hand, passed with little comment despite being partially a response to AUKUS, and also part of the new architecture. 

Greece agreed to buy warships from the French company Naval Group – the same firm which lost the submarine deal when Australia switched to the US and UK. But the agreement is far more than an arms deal. It commits both countries to come to the aid of the other in case of a third-party attack. Both are NATO countries and so are already covered by NATO’s Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all). What is new about this first bi-lateral defence alliance within NATO is that it includes being attacked by a NATO ally. For which read: Turkey. 

For France this is about two things: blocking Turkish influence in the Mediterranean Sea (which connects France to the Francophone regions of Africa), and building President Macron’s vision of Strategic Autonomy for Europe so it does not have to rely on the US, especially after AUKUS. During the agreement’s signing ceremony, the French President noted the American pivot to the Indo-Pacific and said: “It would also be naïve of us… if we didn’t seek to learn lessons from it and act accordingly”. The Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, added that France and Greece are “taking the first step towards a European strategic autonomy”. 

Both leaders framed the deal as strengthening NATO and simultaneously allowing the US to focus on the Indo-Pacific. The Americans nodded quietly in agreement but will wait and see how this plays out. An EU military within NATO allows the US to draw down resources on the continent, but what if participants fail to fund it? What if, with the Americans mostly gone, Madrid, Rome, and Lisbon decide they may not want to fight to save Vilnius? Many of the central and eastern Europeans do not share Macron’s passion for removing the American security umbrella. Washington will be comfortable with a robust modern EU NATO component, but not with a collection of also rans bolstered only by a couple of decent fighting forces. The Europeans’ ability to move forces quickly, provide high tech intelligence and satellite cover is limited – bringing it to American standards will be expensive. 

That is for the future, what is now a clear and present danger is three NATO powers going to war with each other. The text of the Greek/French agreement does not mention Turkey; the preamble mentions a lasting relationship based on common values, and then talks about respecting “the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS). The sentence is aimed squarely at Turkey which under its “Blue Homeland” strategy claims half of the Aegean, and large parts of the gas and oil fields found in Greek and Cypriot waters. Ankara is not a signatory to UNCLOS.

Article 2 is where the action is – France and Greece will “provide each other with assistance with all appropriate means at their disposal, if necessary by the use of armed force, if they jointly find that an armed attack is taking place against the territory of one of the two”. Article 12 then brings us back to the gas and oil issue – “The Parties shall in particular strengthen their exchanges of analyses on energy issues in the Mediterranean” – while Article 17 talks about military cooperation aimed at “improving the interoperability between their Armed Forces.” 

Greece will buy three frigates from the French, the first to be delivered in 2025, the two others the following year. The ships belong to the next generation “digital” frigates and will all have the latest air defence and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and the ability to hit targets more than 100km away. They will combine with the 24 Rafale fighter jets already on order from France, and the modern anti-submarine MH-60R helicopters that Greece bought from the US to be delivered early next year. 

This build-up comes at a time when war between Greece and Turkey is not an outlandish prospect, and the leaderships of France and Turkey are having a war of words. In 2020, Macron sent warships to the Aegean to support the Greek navy in a standoff with Turkish ships, and in a separate incident a Turkish warship locked its weapons system onto a French navy vessel. 

Last October, after a French school teacher, Samuel Paty, was beheaded in a Paris suburb, Macron spoke about “Islamist separatism”. President Erdoğan responded: “What is the problem of this person, called Macron, with Islam and Muslims?”. A few hours later the French presidency said: “Excess and rudeness are not a method.” Erdoğan questioned Macron’s mental state, and France recalled its ambassador. The following month Erdoğan said: “I hope France will get rid of Macron as soon as possible.” Next year’s French elections should be fun given the accusations that Turkey meddled in the 2017 German elections, and that the far right Turkish nationalist “Grey Wolves” movement is said to operate in France. 

Erdoğan’s former security advisor Mesut Hakkı Caşın has been busy doing his bit for international harmony by threatening to invade Greece and throw the American troops there into the sea. But all the while, Greece is getting on with making friends and influencing arms manufacturers. It is busy forging links with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all of which share a dislike of Erdoğan. Perhaps more importantly – its military ties with the US are growing ever stronger. 

This week the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias has been in Washington for the Greece-US Strategic Dialogue meeting which included a meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken. They signed an amendment to the two countries’ Mutual Defence and Cooperation Agreement which, as Blinken said, extends the agreement “indefinitely, and it enables US forces in Greece to train and operate from additional locations.”

Greece is positioning itself to become America’s go-to ally in the Mediterranean, especially if Turkey continues on its trajectory of not being a reliable NATO ally. Simultaneously it is forging ties with a loose alliance of countries suspicious of Turkey’s foreign policy, and now has a defence pact with France. 

It may increase tensions in the Aegean, it may undermine NATO, it may not yet mean European strategic autonomy, but it strengthens Greece and weakens Turkey.