These are volatile times for a new government to be in power. There are multiplying threats and opportunities to manage from emerging technologies and the climate crisis, compounded by digital interconnectedness, online extremism, regional conflicts and fracturing global geopolitics. Cue a global IT outage within the first fortnight of Keir Starmer’s premiership, and his growing familiarity with the Cobra room since.
Labour’s five missions and six first steps would be engulfed by one Covid-scale crisis. Former Foreign Secretary William Hague has urged Starmer to adopt “a war-leader’s role”. He’s right. Labour must urgently organise the centre of government to underpin the national renewal to which they aspire.
Despite the mantra that public safety and security are paramount, the fact is the UK isn’t much better prepared to handle another pandemic than it was in 2020. The Covid Inquiry’s initial report has refocused minds rapidly. “There will be a next time” in Baroness Hallett’s words, and our structures “failed the citizens of all four nations” of the UK.
The upshot is a Pat McFadden-led review of national resilience. Labour had already committed in its manifesto to improve resilience and preparation across central government. We can draw a simple lesson from the farmer living above the eroding beach in Washington State who categorically refused to move, coordinated individual homeowners and spent US$400 for a truck of cobblestone to strengthen the foreshore and successfully protect the vulnerable. Now is the “hell no” moment to fix this.
It’s time to lay out a vision for “Resilient Britain” in the next Integrated Review – combining connectedness and innovation with security – and to make resilience a national priority. There’s a ready model for “whole-of-government” resilience which is inexpensive, quick to implement and can complement the “whole-of-society” approach which is also vital. Further legislation and bureaucracy can be avoided by learning from the private sector. Its “three lines” model, which separates the ownership, oversight and audit of risk, offers the blueprint for a cross-cutting framework and clearer accountability.
The previous government’s Resilience Framework provides a foundation. To build on this and simplify, resilience should now be overseen from National Security, with the National Security Adviser (NSA) retitled to National Resilience and Security Adviser (NRSA). Most of the risks we face are security-related. It’s crucial that the process of managing them is led by a more senior official with access to the Prime Minister and not complicated by diverging reporting lines and silos.
Specialist risk management capability should be recruited in the shape of a government Chief Resilience Officer, appointed as a Deputy NSA, to head up the Resilience Directorate and national security teams working on risk. An external appointment would bring balance and challenge the sort of groupthink across government highlighted by the Covid Inquiry.
Regular independent scrutiny of the government’s resilience efforts by a forum of external experts could be coordinated by the National Preparedness Commission ahead of the implementation of an independent statutory body recommended by the Inquiry. The National Risk Register should be revamped with a section added to cover chronic risks over a longer time horizon as well as the comprehensive assessment of preparedness recommended by the Inquiry.
The siloed approach that dogged the Covid response could be overcome by establishing coordinated risk ownership of complex risks like those from AI and biosecurity. Peter Hennessy has described cross-cutting preparedness work by the Ministry of Labour from 1938. A Central Register unit coordinated the recruitment and deployment of top talent across the civil service, which helped make Britain the most mobilised of any state in the ensuing war. Specialist central ownership units should similarly now marshal the efforts of the multiple owners of complex risks across government.
The new structure would allow the UK to play a leading role internationally on resilience. Building on the AI Safety Summit, a multilateral forum of the same invitees could be convened by Labour to tackle global threats, involving potentially hostile states with a common interest in preventing catastrophic risks, and allowing lines of communication to be kept open. As the World Economic Forum correctly identified in this year’s Global Risks Report, “Cross-border coordination remains the only viable pathway for (addressing) the most critical risks to human security and prosperity”.
Most of Starmer’s predecessors this century were suddenly confronted in power by events over which they had little control. Their responses came to define and in some cases haunt their premierships. Labour’s missions are tough enough to deliver without being overtaken by external distractions. Now’s the time to optimise the centre of government for resilience and protect the nascent project of national renewal in a perilous period.
James Ginns is Head of Risk Management Policy at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience
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