“He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.”
Sun Tzu wasn’t just talking about money, but the words of the Chinese philosopher and military strategist should have been playing on Xi Jinping’s mind this week as he announced that China is set to spend $225bn on defence in 2023 – a hefty 7.2% boost compared to last year.
Beijing’s build-up of technological and military might has accelerated since Xi took the helm in 2013, and the fresh injection of cash reinforces his ambitious goal to transform China’s military into “a world-class force” by 2049.
The People’s Liberation Army already boasts hypersonic weapons capable of evading most defence systems – a technology the US is still developing. China also has the world’s largest navy and 2m active military personnel compared to 1.4m in the US.
Xi has made crystal clear his objective to “reunite” Taiwan, which Beijing views as a breakaway province, with mainland China. Joe Biden has dropped heavy hints that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if attacked.
As tensions over Taiwan build, the gap in capabilities between the two powers becomes ever more important. If a military clash occurs – by design or miscalculation – would China be ready?
Mind the gap
In terms of raw spending power, China still plays second fiddle to the US.
Yet while the Chinese Communist Party’s stated annual defence budget is dwarfed by the US’s $797bn, these nominal totals probably overestimate the US advantage.
Analysts believe Beijing’s official figures deliberately undershoot. The US defence department thinks China’s true military spending could be 1.1 to 2 times higher. (“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak” – Sun Tzu again.)
Beijing also gets more bang for its buck. Entry-level pay for soldiers is 16 times higher in the US than in China, for example.
And Xi appears increasingly willing to divert resources to the military. For decades, China’s defence spending has grown more slowly than its economic growth target, and at 1.7% of GDP, its defence budget remains relatively modest compared to other high-spending nations. “The Chinese learned a lesson from the Soviet Union, which overspent on defence,” says Dean Cheng, a senior adviser at the United States Institute of Peace.
This year, however, the 7.2% defence spending boost outpaced the CCP’s GDP growth target of 5% – its lowest in decades.
Weak link
Xi’s big worry is that PLA troops are completely untested. China hasn’t fought a war since a brief border clash with Vietnam in 1979. For US personnel, Iraq and Afghanistan are still all too fresh.
A ramping up of joint exercises with Russia is helping China’s military branches work together more closely and effectively. But an emphasis on ideology means around 40% of new Chinese recruits’ training involves learning about the Communist Party rather than anything practical.
According to the PLA’s own publications, some officers struggle to lead their troops, make flawed operational decisions, and sometimes don’t understand their own orders. “At present, there are not many commanders in the PLA who are truly proficient in joint combat,” one serving officer at the Zhengzhou Joint Logistics Support Centre wrote last year in the PLA Daily, the military’s newspaper. “If this situation does not change, once there is a war, it will be very dangerous.”
Qin Gang, China’s fiery foreign minister, warned this week that unless Washington changes its “distorted” attitude towards Beijing, “conflict and confrontation” will follow. War over Taiwan would incur enormous costs for both sides. But for the time being, China is likely to pay the higher price.
Mattie Brignal,
Defence Editor
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