Israel has struck back at Iran but de-escalation is still possible

Iran: “The matter can be deemed concluded.”
Israel: “No it can’t.”

Since last weekend, Israel has faced a dilemma in knowing how to take action in response to the hundreds of missiles fired at it last weekend, and then agree with Iran that the matter is concluded. Action taken must be calibrated to prevent Iran from changing its mind. There is an escalation ladder the Israelis can climb. Too high, and it’s war. Too low and their decades-long strategy of hard deterrence is weakened.

Overnight, Israel began to climb the ladder. An Israeli missile has hit Iran, two US officials confirmed to CBS News. Iranian state media described a small number of explosions, which it says resulted from Iran’s air defences hitting three drones over the city of Isfahan. But state media has played down the extent of the damage – which is, as yet, unknown – and, notably, it has refrained from naming Israel, instead referring to the incident as an attack by “infiltrators”. The central province of Isfahan is home to a large airbase, a major missile production complex and, crucially, several nuclear facilities. However the global nuclear watchdog says no nuclear sites were damaged. Israel is yet to officially comment on the incident.

There’s a debate in foreign policy and military circles as to the extent of damage Iran intended to cause last weekend with its attack which was made in revenge for the Israeli airstrike on Damascus which killed seven senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) officers in Iran’s consulate. It appears to have been calibrated. Enough was fired at Israel to demonstrate to the domestic audience that Iran was taking a strong line, and the military planners may be disappointed that so few missiles got through. However, they must also have known that Israel could blunt most of the attack, and, crucially, they told everyone what was happening well in advance of the missiles approaching Israeli airspace. Added to the signalling of a limited attack was that Tehran did not call on Hezbollah’s formidable rocket power in the attack. The footage of the launches looked good on Iranian TV, although the decision to show footage of forest fires in Chile and pretend it was their strikes on Israel was a little threadbare.

So, arguably, the Iranians were just showing everyone they are not a paper tiger. But, from the Israeli perspective the shadow war the two have been fighting for years has come into the open and an attack from Tehran requires a reply.

The Iranians may have said the matter can be considered closed, but they also warned that if Iran is attacked, it will retaliate. Tehran left Israel with a range of options, but each of them have potential consequences. Israel is busy in Gaza and may yet be busier in Lebanon, it does not want a full-scale war with Iran and choosing from the top of its options list risks just that. This danger explains the wave of advice from Israel’s friends over the last few days to “bank the win” and move on.  However, Prime Minister Netanyahu, while thanking diplomats for “all kinds of suggestions and advice”, insisted Israel will “make our own decisions”.  Now, he has proven it.

The highest risk retaliation would have been a full-scale air assault on Iran’s military bases and nuclear facilities. This would involve most of Israel’s F-35, F-16, and F-15 jets. Cruise missiles and drones would also be used, and it is possible special forces teams would be on the ground.

They would all face numerous problems. Many of the probable targets are deep inside Iran, up to 1,200 miles from Israel’s closest air base – the Ramat David. It’s unlikely Jordan or Saudi Arabia would open their airspace for the attack and the planes might have to take the longer route down the Red Sea. This means they would probably require either mid-air refuelling, or to carry extra fuel tanks which would then be jettisoned.

Planes are more vulnerable during mid-air refuelling. Carrying extra fuel tanks increases the aircraft’s radar signature meaning it can more easily be spotted and targeted, although the tanks could be dropped before entering Iranian airspace. Iran’s Russian-built Su-35 and MiG fighter jets are no match for the Israeli Air Force and so it has invested in robust air defence capabilities. Tehran has bought the Russian long-range surface-to-air missile defence system – the S-300 which has a range of just under 100 miles, and developed its own Bavar 373 which reportedly can lock onto multiple targets about 250 miles away and hit them at about 190 miles distance. These systems complement the multiple medium-range air defence missiles Iran can deploy.

Many of Israel’s potential targets are buried deep inside mountains and/or are protected by tens of yards of concrete. For example, the main chamber at the Fordow nuclear plant is 80 yards beneath the surface – to bomb your way through that is the equivalent of getting through eight two-storey houses, piled on top of each other, each made of solid concrete. The Israelis do have bunker-busting bombs, but they are smaller than the American versions, and waves of attacks would be required to get through.

The above scenario would spark an Iranian response and we would quickly be climbing the escalation ladder. Down from an all-out attack is a smaller wave of cruise missiles hitting fewer targets, for example IRGC bases, or the air force firing long-range “stand-off” missiles thus reducing the risk of losing aircraft and having pilots captured. This choice still carries a high risk of escalation.

Targeting the IRGC outside of Iran would have been another option, safer than above, but still a risk. Down the menu is hitting Iran’s proxies such as those in Yemen and Iraq in a wave of attacks. As few Iranians would be killed, and Iran’s sovereignty not infringed, Tehran could decide not to hit back in the near future. A complicating factor would be if Hezbollah was seriously targeted as it has its own “deterrence” agenda and an arsenal of long-range missiles.

Assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and military commanders inside Iran, and blowing up pipelines are other options which, although provocative, have the possibility of deniability even if everyone knows who is really behind them. The Israelis have carried out several such attacks this century. Finally, there are cyber-attacks, another option Israel has taken in recent years.

It seems the Israeli war cabinet has chosen to go for the “head of the octopus” as some officials refer to Iran, as opposed to its “tentacles”, meaning its proxies.

However, reports so far indicate that Israel’s strike was fairly restrained. A senior Iranian official, speaking under the condition of anonymity, told Reuters today that Tehran has no plan for immediate retaliation against Israel.

The limited scale of the strike and Iran’s muted response to it offer hope that the foes may be able to climb down the escalation ladder from here.

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