Israel-Hezbollah war could still be on the cards

Another war in the Middle East? Early this spring in Lebanon? Maybe. Maybe not.

Here’s why  “maybe”.  Within a few weeks, the Israeli operations in Gaza will be further scaled down. The remaining troops will still face attacks from the remnants of the Hamas brigades, but the IDF will be able to turn north and face down Hezbollah without risking major combat on two fronts. The main reasons to do this are economic and strategic.

First, the economy. After the Oct 7 massacres by Hamas in the south, Hezbollah began firing short-range rockets into Israel from just north of the Lebanese border. The level of fire, and Israel’s response, is calibrated. For Hezbollah, it is just enough to display solidarity with Hamas and pin substantial numbers of Israeli troops at the border, but, for both sides, it is not enough to spark a war. Four Israeli civilians and nine IDF troops have been killed: along with more than 20 Lebanese civilians and over 100 Hezbollah fighters.

However, Hezbollah’s missiles, and the fear of a Hamas-style massacre, forced more than 100,000 Israelis in the north to flee their homes. About 60,000 remain displaced, some staying with families, others in hotels paid for by the government. A similar number of Lebanese civilians have fled northwards.

Dozens of towns and villages in the agricultural regions of northern Israel are now empty. The fruit and vegetable industries there are at a standstill as is the wine industry. This is having a serious effect on the Israeli economy, which is already suffering from the collapse of tourism, alongside the impact of hundreds of thousands of military reservists leaving their jobs to fight with the IDF in the aftermath of Oct 7.

Hezbollah has ensured that Israelis cannot live safely in a large part of Israel. Israeli war cabinet minister Benny Gantz has now said that the situation “must change”. Prime Minister Netanyahu believes a fundamental realignment is required and that “We will not stop until this goal has been achieved.”

The second reason there may be a war is nebulous, but real. The shock of Oct 7 has broken Israel’s confidence that its renowned intelligence capabilities meant it could see threats emerging. In Lebanon, after degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities in the 2006 war, Israel fought the “campaign between the wars.” The strategy was that by constantly hitting the convoys of Iranian weapons shipments travelling through Syria and Lebanon they would persistently weaken Hezbollah and delay the need for overt, major conflict.  

That has now changed. Increasing numbers of Israeli military strategists are moving to a position that Israel must rely on “pre-emptive defence” – strike before you are struck. By so doing, and winning, you also re-establish your reputation as the most formidable military in the region.  

Hezbollah is thought to have an arsenal of more than 150,000 rockets, most of them stored in warehouses. More than half are 122 mm rockets with a maximum range of 40km. Hezbollah also has Fajr-5 missiles with a range of 75 km, Khaibar-1 which can fly up to 100km, the Zelzal class – 210 km, and Fateh ballistic missiles with a range of 250 km. The latter are guided missiles which, while not as accurate as those in a modern state army’s arsenal, could mostly hit their targets, especially if Israel’s Iron Dome system was overwhelmed by other rockets. Finally, Hezbollah is thought to have a handful of missiles capable of travelling 1,000 km, and even a few 2,000 km cruise missiles.

Although Hezbollah can hit anywhere in Israel, the Israeli demand, if it comes, will probably only be for Hezbollah to abide by UN Resolution 1701 which was passed at the end of the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war. It established a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon and required forces in Lebanon (Hezbollah) to withdraw north of the Litani River some of which is about 20 km from the Israeli border.  The IDF was required to move back to the “Blue Line” – effectively the border, but Hezbollah and the Lebanese government contested 13 border points along the Blue Line, and still does. Hezbollah soon re-established itself in force south of the Litani from where it launches rockets and uses the contested points to justify its presence.

If Hezbollah could be persuaded to move back behind the Litani, most of its weapons could not reach northern Israel, and the civilians could go back home and go back to work. However, Hezbollah cannot be seen to give in to Israeli demands and get nothing in return.

In the “maybe not” scenario, after tensions are raised, diplomacy kicks in. Hezbollah moves back, the two-way rocket fire ends, and in return Israel accepts Lebanon’s version of the Blue Line (discussed above) and possibly even relinquishes control of the contested Shebaa Farms area which it has controlled since 1967. This allows the civilians on both sides to return home, but also allows Hezbollah to claim a victory.

It’s a plausible scenario, but so is “maybe”. Israel has made its strength of feeling plain. The assassination by drone missile of the Hamas deputy head, Saleh Arouri, in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, was a humiliation for Hezbollah even if the Israelis waited until Hezbollah members had left the room he was in before firing their missile. The subsequent killing of one of the commanders of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force was an even clearer signal that Israel is prepared to do whatever it takes to stop the rocket fire.

So, maybe, maybe not. But by the Ides of March – the focus may well be on the winds of potential war blowing in the north.

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