NATO under friendly fire

NATO chief, Jens Stoltenberg, has just been crowned “Diplomat of the Year” by Foreign Policy, one of Washington’s most influential global affairs magazines. On accepting the honour on his visit to Washington earlier this month the secretary general hailed NATO as a “unique diplomatic force multiplier,” making the case that “when 29 nations speak with one voice, their voice is more powerful than any other in the world”.

But has Stoltenberg spoken too soon? Not all NATO members are speaking with one voice. Some are speaking with many tongues: President Emmanuel Macron in particular, with his recent comments that we are currently experiencing the brain death of NATO, and that the alliance is on the “verge of redundancy.”

Even allowing for linguistic confusions, the French president knew exactly what he was saying. He is well-known for harbouring grand ideas for a new order in European defence arrangements, and has privately told his closest circle that NATO will be gone in five years time.

With Chancellor Angela Merkel on her way out and Britain exiting the EU, the ambitious Macron is itching to carve a grander role for himself, and for France, on the continent and the wider world. It’s why he is cosying up to President Putin and has suggested bringing Russia in from the cold, believing that cooperation is preferable to confrontation and that sanctions against Russia have had their day.

With the UK heading out of the EU, France becomes Europe’s biggest military spender, giving Macron the chance to build a Gaullist vision with him as the leader of a beefed up European Defence Union. He was also the sole EU leader to veto talks with Albania and North Macedonia about accession which shows how much he wants to stay in control.

Macron’s timing could not have been worse. His remarks about NATO came just days before the 30th anniversary of the Berlin Wall coming down and went down across Europe like an old lead Zeppelin. As well as being ungrateful, his remarks were considered rude given how much NATO has done to keep Western Europe safe during the Cold War years.

Even the usually placid Merkel is said to be furious with Macron, calling his comments “drastic”. At a dinner last week to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, she is said to have told him: “I understand your desire for disruptive politics. But I’m tired of picking up the pieces. Over and over, I have to glue together the cups you have broken so that we can then sit down and have a cup of tea together.”

According to the New York Times, a defiant Macron defended himself, telling Merkel that he could not go to the meeting of NATO leaders to be held outside London next week and pretend that the US and Turkey have worked together in the collective interest in Syria: “I cannot sit there and act like nothing has happened.”

Macron may have a point when it comes to the fragility of the NATO alliance. This is what he also said in the now infamous Economist interview: “Just look at what’s happening. You have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of strategic decision-making between the United States and its NATO allies. None.”

He went on: “NATO is only as strong as its member states, so it only works if the guarantor of last resort functions as such… I’d argue that we should reassess the reality of what NATO is in the light of the commitment of the United States.”

But Macron is not naive or stupid enough to knock down either the Trumpian tower or US might. He did also say that the United States remains our “major ally, we need them, we are close and we share the same values.” However, what he does believe is that a Trumpian America is more isolationist, and wants to prepare for the potential collapse of the alliance by bolstering Europe’s capabilities. More pertinently, he shed doubts on the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, claiming: “I don’t know what Article 5 will mean tomorrow.” His eyes are perhaps on Turkey.

Macron is not the only one to question the integrity of the alliance. President Trump himself has been even ruder about NATO’s existence, arguing only a few years ago that it was obsolete. He has also criticised states such as Germany for freeloading off US dollars which have provided the basis for their country’s security.

The US President also appears to agree with Macron that Russia might be better brought inside a new coalition, rather then left on the outside brooding. He sees his real enemies as China and Iran, and that Russia could be part of a broader American coalition rather than ganged up with his enemies in an alternative alliance led by China. The Poles and others, with experience of Russian aggression, point out that forging an alliance with Putin is a dangerous idea.

There are other political alliances underpinning Nato which are fraying. Turkey is straying further from the West as tensions along the Syrian border have shown, and there are growing divisions over trade between the US and Germany.

Germany itself is attempting to take a fresh approach to defence, as demonstrated by comments by its defence minister and heir apparent to Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, known as AKK.

In a recent speech to a German defence college, AKK warned of the threats to the transatlantic relationship from within the Trump administration and from outside, mainly Russia’s Putin. She pointed out that Europe – France and Germany – must  stand up and defend themselves.

At first, AKK’s comments were perceived to be at odds with Macron but most commentators now realise they were in the same vein: Europe must stand up for itself. She also said that Germany would not meet its Nato 2% spending target until the 2030s.

“We intend to strengthen European cooperation in the field of defence. We have ambitious plans that we want to implement with the other EU members.” she argued, although she acknowledged the role of NATO too. “The European Defence Union is always oriented towards cooperation with Nato, which remains the anchor of security in Europe. We want complementarity, not competition.”

This was a critical about turn by AKK as for decades Germans have been taught – and have accepted the view – that Germany’s interests as a geopolitical force are not to be pursued. That no longer seems to be the case.

Like Macron, AKK fears the threat of a rising China and that the EU will become marginalised. While both accept the role of the US within Nato, they also fear that America’s resolve to be part of a broader alliance is diminishing.

Timothy Less from the University of Cambridge’s Centre for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy says: “Without political unity, there are no common interests to defend – hence Macron’s comments that NATO is brain dead.”

Paradoxically, at the same time that tensions are rising within the NATO family, relations between Russia and NATO become more tense. Some specialists say that they are at their worst since the end of the Cold War, as witnessed by the recent strengthening of NATO “battlegroups” along the Baltic States.

The four NATO battlegroups stationed in the Baltic have recently been strengthened in the biggest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence in a generation. These moves have been prompted by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and heightened political espionage and cyber security risks from Russia.

Yet despite NATO’s strengthening its forces, and EU sanctions, it’s pretty clear that Russia is never going to return Crimea and is unlikely to give up occupation of eastern Ukraine. NATO also knows that any attempts by Ukraine to join will be resisted by Russia.

So Stoltenberg will need all his legendary charm when leaders from NATO’s 29 members meet on December 3rd and 4th for their meeting at the Grove Hotel in Hertfordshire on the outskirts of London. It’s the former home of the Earls of Clarendon, the first of whom was Britain’s ambassador to France. Here’s hoping some diplomatic skills will have rubbed off on the brickwork.

After a dinner at Buckingham Palace the night before to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary, Stoltenberg and heads of state including President Trump, Chancellor Merkel and President Macron, meet on the Wednesday to thrash out some of these more sensitive issues.

The former Norwegian Prime Minister knows all too well that NATO is on dodgy ground but will attempt to walk tall by addressing these issues head on and smooth over the controversies. He will have hoped to have Trump on side after meeting him in Washington earlier in the month.

He knows the score. On the day before Macron’s comments, the NATO chief made a powerful speech to the Korber Global Leaders Dialogue in Berlin, in which he said: “Any attempt to distance Europe from North America will not only weaken the transatlantic Alliance, it is also risking dividing Europe itself. European unity cannot replace transatlantic unity. I strongly welcome efforts to strengthen European defence. …which can enhance capabilities and burden sharing within NATO. But the European Union cannot defend Europe.”

“This is partly about military might,” he said. “After Brexit, 80% of NATO’s defence expenditure will come from non-EU Allies. And Germany will be the only EU member leading one of NATO’s battlegroups in the east of the Alliance. It is also about geography. From Norway in the North, to Turkey in the South, and the US, Canada and the UK in the West. All are key to keeping Europe safe.”

Those are tough words from Stoltenberg. But will they be enough to prevent France – with or without Germany’s support – from beefing up the European Defence Union in an attempt to either split or indeed replace NATO?

The secretary general is visiting Macron in Paris this week (correct) and will be hoping to calm the French President ahead of next week’s meeting. Insiders say that Macron and his officials want NATO to announce a new strategic review of the organisation’s mission – the last one was in 2010.

To keep tempers from fraying and prevent a NATO bust-up, Germany and other nations are said to be pushing for the leaders to create a new “expert group” to redefine and refine NATO’s agenda.

That rather sounds like kicking the can down the road, which is precisely what Poland and many central and Eastern European countries are hoping because they want to see the outcome of the US elections. Like Merkel, they are furious with Macron’s controversial intervention.

There are also many EU members which are neutral: the constitutions of Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria stop them from joining an EU defence force. What’s more, the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, which are on the front-line with Russia, still primarily trust the US with their security and are unlikely to commit to an EU force which excludes US commitment.

However much Macron may desire a bigger EU defence force, he is unlikely to be able to bring all 27 members along with him. Indeed, one of the problems that Macron faces with his attempts to create a more meaty European military capability is that defence goes deep into the psyche of national sovereignty.

Few EU countries want to give up that sovereignty lightly, and many will be wary of allowing the EU to order troops into battle in pursuit of a cause which that state may not be in agreement with.

The chances of getting a unified European army which would have anything like the clout of Article V off the ground are remote, if not delusional. Don’t forget that 22 of the 27 EU countries are also members of NATO.

Stoltenberg knows this, and will play to Europe’s sensibilities at the Grove Hotel next week. In his Korber speech, he was honest about admitting to conflicts between the allies over “trade, energy, climate change, Iran…and northeast Syria.” But he also pointed out that NATO has faced – and overcome – many challenges in the past such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. And will do so once again.

By far the biggest area of controversy is NATO’s relationship with Russia, the hot spot where there is most friction between Macron and NATO’s other members. Macron also argued in his recent interview that NATO still has the containment of Russia as its primary strategic objective and that NATO’s expansion – up to Russia’s borders – left the country without a security zone.

De facto, Macron was backing Putin’s view that Russia has the right to veto the actions of the West in the old Soviet states, such as Ukraine, a view which sets him apart from most of his EU neighbours.

For his part, Stoltenberg is clear about NATO’s role but also its ambitions: “We will do whatever is needed to keep our citizens safe. But we will not mirror what Russia is doing. We do not want a new arms race. We do not want another Cold War. And we have no intention of deploying new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.”

More positively, he added: “NATO allies remain committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. And to open and meaningful dialogue with Russia.”

That’s the key question. Is there room for dialogue? This is the challenge for Stoltenberg and his allies to resolve if he wants to keep NATO alive.

So what changes, if any, will we see to Europe defending itself over the next decade? Timothy Less predicts that NATO will continue with its existing framework but that there will be new twists to its shape: “NATO’s Article V guarantee will be conditional, and real security will derive from ad hoc alliances among NATO members with common interests.”

These alliances will operate at the regional level, with the Nordics and the central Europeans tightening their collective security arrangements, he says. Small states in eastern Europe will try to enlist large states, such as the US and the UK, as allies.

What of Britain, NATO ‘s second biggest military spender? Who knows. What’s for sure is that there are many issues still to resolve over future relations between the EU and the UK – and the UK’s commitment to the European Defence Union – within the Withdrawal Agreement that are yet to be agreed.  But once the UK sits outside of the European Union, maybe it will decide to once again become what historian Professor Brendan Simms calls “the principle ordering power in Europe.”