Britain should keep a foot in Europe’s door

One of the most frequently heard assertions by Brexiteers keen to be seen as open-minded and liberal is that the UK is leaving the EU, not Europe.

Very well. But what does this mean? In one sense, it is obvious. As I have had cause to remark in recent days, Calais will still be 21 miles from Dover on March 30, or on whichever date Britain actually takes leave of the European Union. Much as some on the Brexit side might regret the fact, the nation is not about to up-anchor and move to Southeast Asia.

So we are staying where we have always been, with our south coast facing towards France and Belgium and our eastern counties looking out in the direction of the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia.

It ought to be considered banal to point this out, but the fact is that many of those who support Brexit wish fervently that we could, like an oil tanker, turn around and set sail for the far side of the world. Indeed, there are many who argue that, in spirit, if not as a matter of geographical fact, we should in future think of the UK as situated midway between California, Australia and Singapore, about 500 miles west of Hawaii.

Let me be clear. I have nothing against increasing our trade with the Far East, Australasia and the United States. The more trade, the better. After all, Germany has been doing exactly that for the last 20 years, as has France, which this week signed a $35 billion contract to supply 12 attack submarines to the Royal Australian Navy. But to pretend that Europe, come March 30, will move into Britain’s rear-view mirror is self-defeating and absurd.

In 2017 (the latest year for which complete figures are available), the EU remained the UK’s biggest trading partner, accounting for 44 per cent of our exports and 53 per cent of our imports – the latter statistic often cited by Brexiteers as a hidden strength but which in fact points to a trade deficit, including services, of £67 billion. That volume of trade may well diminish in the years ahead, but the idea that we will suddenly start selling massively more in the Pacific region, while simultaneously saving billions of pounds each year by way of cheap imports of food, clothing and footwear, is surely a delusion.

Trade deals take years, even decades, to negotiate, which is why the handful recently announced by Liam Fox turn out to be exact replicants of existing deals with the EU.

Whatever change occurs will take place only gradually, and then only if we start producing goods that for reasons that are somehow attributable to our EU membership are currently disregarded by overseas customers. In consideration of the difficulties involved in such a commercial pivot, we should perhaps bear in mind Sir James Dyson’s recent statement that in order to be “global” from an Asian perspective, it is necessary to be based in Asia, not the UK.

In the meantime, Europe isn’t going anywhere, and if we have any sense – which is debatable – we will be working overtime to save and secure what we can from our present relationship and then add to it, so that the UK in future is seen by the 27 as interesting, dynamic and, most of all, integral to their own future success.

Here are a few suggestions.

Theresa May used to bang on about Britain as a vital link in the chain of security that keeps Europe safe. Recently, she has more or less been silent on the idea, as if aware that no one is listening. But she should persist. Brexit has robbed the UK of the European Banking Authority and the European Medicines Agency, with the former relocated to Paris and the latter to Amsterdam. Neither of these was a game-changer. We have to go for something bigger – much bigger – to show that we mean business.

What about an all-new European Intelligence Agency that is not part of the EU but has EU representation, based in London and working closely with Nato, Interpol, GCHQ, the CIA and the Five Eyes global network? Only Britain could underwrite such an organisation. The EIA would have real prestige. Its remit would not be to coordinate military action ­– that would remain the responsibility of Nato – but rather to build and develop intelligence on enemies of democracy, external and internal, that threaten Europe. MI6 would be, de facto, the lead contributor, sharing responsibility with its French and German counterparts. GCHQ, with its unique hi-tech capability, would be another key selling point.

No doubt there would be those, including some in Germany and France, not to mention Whitehall, who would reject the idea on the basis that some secrets are too secret to be shared with others. But if that is the case, and no one is to be trusted, then why should Europe trust us anymore than we trust them? Every Man for Himself is hardly the best slogan for a continent surrounded by Russia, the Middle East, North Africa and the Atlantic. More to the point, the EIA, while demonstrably European, would be a British initiative, based on British strengths, removed from the unaccountable hand of Brussels.

Something else that might keep the UK in touch with the rule-making aspect of the EU without being part of it would be the appointment of a British advocate-general to the European Court of Justice. Advocates-general are senior judges who do not make decisions on issues that come before the court. Rather, a bit like solicitors in the English legal system, they prepare the ground and advise on the strength and weaknesses of cases that are due to be heard. Their opinions are influential, but they do not have a vote. Their appointment is a matter for the heads of government, acting on a request from the court. Always assuming that Britain strikes a deal with the EU that keeps us closely linked to the Single Market and Customs Union, there seems no good reason why Britain should not at least keep a foot in the door.

Third, I suggest that we propose the creation of a specialist British interests department within the Berlaymont that would provide a link, by way of the UK mission in Brussels, between the Government in London and the higher echelons of the European Commission. There would, of course, be objections to such a proposal. The French would say no, as they say no to most suggestions emanating from London. But if the EU is serious about regarding the UK as a special case and not simply another third country, this would be one way of showing it. The department would be small and would have no constitutional standing. It would have no decision-making powers. It would, however, be a practical conduit between London and Brussels that could identify sticking points and bring them to the attention of those best able to address them.

One thing we can be sure of is that if Britain comes up with nothing to improve relations with our European partners post-Brexit, then nothing is what we will end up with. It is time to be positive, even audacious. That said, if No Deal is the result to which we are headed, then all bets are off. In that event, we will truly be on our own.