A democratic dawn in Damascus is possible if we learn from recent history
While western governments shouldn't indulge in naïve optimism over unfolding events in Syria, nor should they give in to blind cynicism.
For many Syrians across the world, it feels as if a new dawn has broken over Damascus. The capture of the Syrian capital by rebel forces fighting under the banner of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the implosion of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad have burst asunder the political landscape. With Assad’s departure for exile in Moscow, over fifty years of brutal authoritarian rule by the Assad family has come to a close. A regime that clung onto power through nearly fourteen bloody years of civil war collapsed in less than fourteen days.
There are many reasons for caution in this hour of euphoria and optimism. Syrians are caught between their joy at the fall of Assad and a sense of apprehension about what comes next. Observers have been justified in pointing out the challenges that confront Syrians as they begin to grapple with building a new political order.
Make no mistake, the situation is a difficult one. Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the charismatic leader of the group that has seized control of Damascus, is a former ally of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. His claims to have moderated his youthful extremism and to have embraced religious pluralism may turn out to be an illusion. Furthermore, HTS is not in control of the entire country: in the North East, Syrian Kurds are guarding their autonomy against an assault from another rebel group: the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). To the south, in the Hawran Plateau, other rebel groups have liberated themselves without the direct assistance of HTS.
In this context, any attempt to impose a new dictatorship centred on Damascus could unleash a new phase of civil war. In turn, any renewed outbreak of conflict is likely to further fragment the country and invite further intervention from foreign powers, all of which could pave the way for a revival of ISIS and turn the country into another Libya or Yemen.
Under these circumstances, it would be easy to give in to the council of despair. Yet, in the words of Syrian playwright Saadallah Wannous, we are condemned to hope.
Syria’s new dawn need not be a false one. While bearing in mind the immense challenges that confront Syria after the fall of Assad, it is incumbent on well-wishing governments across the world to give Syrians every possible chance of success in rebuilding their country. For western governments, this process begins with having a clear understanding of what a post-Assad transition might look like. We must prepare for success as well as for failure.
Moving forward, the experiences of other Arab states can help to shed light on Syria’s potential path beyond dictatorship, offering lessons for how it might build a stable and more just system in the rubble of its long and devastating Civil War. The experiences of these countries suggest that the path away from authoritarianism and towards democracy is one fraught with perils and pitfalls. Nonetheless, recent history can help us to plan for what might happen next.
The first lesson is that a political transition process will only be successful if it includes a broad range of political groups and factions. The model here is Tunisia following the Arab Spring in 2011, where an alliance of secular and Islamist opposition groups joined forces with civil society organisations and moderates within the ousted Ben ‘Ali regime. The warning is Libya after the fall of Qaddafi, where a legacy of mistrust among opposition figures, strong local identities, political fragmentation and weak civic organisations undermined efforts to coordinate a peaceful and orderly democratic transition.
The exhaustion of Syria’s thirteen-year civil war could work in different ways. On the one hand, it may deprive Syria of the strong civil institutions that helped Tunisia to complete a transition towards democracy. On the other, the shared experience of repression by the Assad regime may bond secular and Islamist opposition groups together and encourage them to compromise with one another. They might judge that were Syria to lapse once again into civil war, they would all lose more than they would gain.
There have been some encouraging signs coming out of the country in this respect. It is difficult to assess how sincere HTS’s leader, al-Jolani, is being when he declares his commitment to religious pluralism and an orderly political transition. Still, the group has so far honoured its pledge to respect the rights of Syria’s non-Sunni religious minorities. There are reports of retribution being carried out on a personal level against specific individuals associated with the Assad regime. However, HTS has not ransacked religious buildings or enacted sectarian vengeance on minority groups. So far, it has sought to behave like a national liberation movement rather than as a salafi-jihadist vanguard.
Equally, since capturing Damascus, al-Jolani has refrained from acting like a victorious warlord. On the contrary, he has ordered that soldiers be stationed outside of civilian areas, allowing a sense of normality to return to Syrian cities under his control. He has also appointed a transition Prime Minister, Mohamed al-Bashir, who claims to have invited figures from the Assad regime to cooperate in building “a constitutional system” that will “serve the Syrian people.”
Crucially, HTS’s leader appears to understand that there is little appetite among Syrians for more bloodshed. Al-Jolani himself has stated publicly that: “People are exhausted by war, so the country isn’t ready for another one and it’s not going to get into another one.” He added: “The source of our fears was the Iranian militias, Hezbollah and the regime...So their removal is the solution for Syria.” This may also be understood as a subliminal message to Israel: we have seen you decapitate and decimate Hamas and Hezbollah; we are not seeking to become your next target and will not threaten your security.
A second important lesson to note is that Islamist parties are likely to triumph in any fair and free elections that may take place. This happened to varying degrees in Algeria in 1991, Tunisia in 2011, Egypt in 2011-2012, and in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (which were won by Hamas). This has happened historically for two reasons: on an organisational level, because Islamists are able mobilise election campaigns using mosque networks and associated social welfare institutions, while non-Islamist parties tend to be more divided and disorganised; and on an ideological level, because Islamist parties are often able to rally popular anger against secular authoritarian regimes or present themselves as national resistance movements.
Western governments should prepare for the possibility that, in free and fair elections, a future HTS-backed political party might win a landslide victory. The group will be viewed by many Syrians, particularly among the Sunni Arab majority, as the deliverers of the nation. In addition, it has an administrative apparatus in Idlib and currently controls the institutions of the state. It is conceivable that this combination could translate into a substantial electoral advantage under a democratic system.
Thirdly, long-term democratic consolidation can only take hold if armed groups lay down their arms and integrate into a politically neutral military. So long as HTS or other rebel groups keep hold of their weapons and maintain private paramilitary forces, the institutions of the state will remain weak. One need only examine the way in which sectarian militias have cannibalised and hollowed out the state in Lebanon and Iraq to understand this point.
If HTS and other Syrian opposition groups are serious about building democratic institutions, then their leaders will have to be incentivised to permanently swap their combat fatigues for suits. Meanwhile, the rank and file will have to be kept in the barracks as part of an amalgamated national army – one which owes its loyalty to the state rather than to individual warlords or factions.
To be effective, any political transition will require the provision of generous financial support and humanitarian aid. Syria’s infrastructure and economy have been left in ruins by the last thirteen years of fighting. It will take a sustained international effort to rebuild them. Some countries have already come forward: Germany announced today that it would provide an additional 8 million euros for humanitarian aid in Syria. However, to fund successful construction in the long run, Syria’s new government will also need to persuade the oil-exporting Arab Gulf States to free up a portion of their deep coffers.
All of this poses the awkward question of what to do with HTS, which is still designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN, the US, the UK and even Turkey. The response of western governments should essentially be pragmatic: trust, but verify. They should work with HTS so long as it continues to commit itself to building a civilian government with respect for the rights of all Syrians. If HTS reneges on its commitments, support should cease.
This approach has, in effect, been adopted by the G7, which is set to announce that it will support the new Syrian government so long as its transition process safeguards the rights of minorities. Meanwhile, the UN’s special envoy for Syria has suggested that HTS could be removed from its list of proscribed terrorist groups if it commits to “credible and inclusive transitional arrangements in Damascus.”
There is no guarantee that today’s new dawn in Damascus will flourish and develop into a durable democratic spring. After over a decade of civil war, Syrian civil society may be too fragile to sustain a successful transition. The new HTS-led transition government in Damascus may lapse into a Sunni Islamist dictatorship. Rival armed groups backed by competing foreign patrons may end up fighting one another for dominance and open up a dark new chapter in the ongoing struggle for Syria.
None of this, however, should prevent western governments from being ready to seize the possibilities that have been opened up by the fall of the Assad regime. Western leaders and policymakers should resist giving in to blind cynicism as well as indulging in naïve optimism when they formulate their approach to the situation now unfolding in Syria. As Joseph Nye likes to remind us, foreign policy ought to begin with realism, but it should not end there. Similarly, any efforts to support Syria’s post-Assad transition ought to proceed with a sober awareness of the realities on the ground, but must also strive to build a better world.