Berlusconi to stand again for the Italian presidency at 85
The pantomime season seemed to come early to the Italian parliament a few weeks back when MPs and Senators found their email inboxes bombarded by pictures and speeches provided by Silvio Berlusconi, 85, in his bid to be elected President of the Italian Republic.
No stranger to a touch of theatre, the former prime minister, billionaire, Bunga-Bunga artiste, once earned a crust as a crooner on cruise liners. At 85, his complexion has the sheen of all-weather teak garden furniture. Were he to be elected in this year’s presidential elections, he would be 92 when the term expires in 2029. The first round of voting is on January 24. He thinks he is well up to the task – and achieving the presidency would be the pinnacle to a colourful career which has brought as many collisions with the courts as the Italian electorate.
After all, Italy is the cradle of opera buffa, not to forget la commedia dell’ arte and Pulcinella, forebear of Mr Punch. After all, Mr Berlusconi popularised campaigning by cable television and the internet decades before Donald Trump. He still has a strong following among some Italians. But few among the college of 1009 ‘grand electors’ – 630 parliamentary deputies, 321 senators and 58 representatives from Italy’s regions – tasked with job of choosing the next president, take his candidature seriously.
Not that the election to this largely ceremonial and highly prestigious post is being taken lightly. This time round it is particularly weighty, and the outcome could have serious implications for Italy’s economic recovery from years of economic slump, dysfunctional governance and Covid. The job has become steadily more important since the Italian Republican was born in 1948.The president may have few real powers, but he – and it always has been a ‘he’ to date – has growing influence. The president can choose a new prime minister, approve the cabinet and its programme, dissolve parliament and order new elections. The president heads the governing body of the judiciary and the key budget oversight committee.
The last three presidents, including Sergio Mattarella the present incumbent, have wielded their powers with subtlety and skill, sometimes decisively so. They have saved the country from constitutional shipwreck, and previous steered Italians through the major terrorist campaign of the Red Brigades, a series of homegrown and international financial crises, as well as the perennial problems of mass illegal immigration. Predecessors include Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, a former Bank of Italy Governor, and the veteran conscience of the centre-left, Giorgio Napolitano – who managed to curb the excesses of Silvio Berlusconi in his last run as prime minister.
The current president, the softly spoken but effective Sicilian Sergio Mattarella, made the decisive move of asking one of Italy’s leading bankers and economic brains, Mario Draghi, to head an emergency government last February. Draghi was to manage the expenditure of a recovery fund of some €220 billion from the EU and the Italian Treasury to reverse spiralling economic collapse and mount a social and fiscal recovery from the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Now, Draghi is at the heart of Italy’s conundrum about the presidency. He is not even sure that he wants the job, previously saying he wanted to see his recovery programme through until Spring 2023, prior to the parliamentary elections that have to be held by 1st June that year. Were he to want the job, he is likely to be chosen in the first two or three ballots of the electoral college, despite these requiring two thirds of the votes – at least 673 ballots out of the 1,009.
Draghi’s election would mean handing over the prime minister’s chair to a trusted colleague to see through his reform package. This would require a parliamentary vote of confidence – always a bit of a performance in Italy’s parliamentary theatre, and a risky one.
This is where the importance of the election suddenly becomes much deeper and wider – with an impact on Europe and beyond. Mario Draghi’s reforms have managed to restore a sense of stability to Italian politics and public administration, and offered a point of reference of clear strategic thinking to the EU and its allies. Not that the programme has gone entirely smoothly. But Draghi’s term of as prime minister has brought new growth at last to the Italian economy. Much needed law reforms – especially to mitigate trial delays and back logs – are now on the way. Draghi’s determination to redress the glaring imbalance of women in the professions is reported to be bearing fruit. Youth unemployment, however, remains stubbornly high.
He has been involved in new bilateral treaty arrangements between Italy and the new German coalition, and with President Macron of France. He has had early meetings with Chancellor Olaf Scholtz to discuss EMU progress and EU banking convergence, if not unification. The two know each other well from previous incarnations as Governor of the European Central Bank and Germany’s Finance Minister, and know how to do business.
The picture seems rather different with Macron. The Quirinal Treaty between Rome and Paris has not turned out as strong as had first been advertised. In part this seems to be down to a classic piece of Emmanuel Macron grand-standing. He wanted France to be acknowledged by the EU leader in defence and foreign policy, and thus appeared to be talking past the Italians.
The Italians have recently been much more successful than France in naval sales and exports. Their shipbuilding industries are supposed to be joined in a 50-50 venture called Naviris. But so far the Italians have outsold the French with their design of the FREMM frigate – originally an Italo-French design – with Italian sales to Indonesia, Qatar and the new class of frigate for the US Navy. Fincantieri of Italy is now the fourth largest naval builder in the world, and recently won a contract from Mexico to build the largest naval shipyard in Latin America.
A recent private meeting I had with a senior French diplomat confirmed the current French insouciance towards Italy’s role in Europe and strategy and stability throughout the region, and towards Mario Draghi in particular. Though having served in Italy, the senior envoy seemed little bothered about Draghi and the Italian presidential election – dismissing Italian politics as a continuous mess. What really counted, it seemed, was how the Elysée handled the incoming German coalition government, the Ukraine crisis (though this didn’t cause too much concern), and France taking the lead for better EU relations with China.
By seeing Italy, and with it Spain, Greece and Portugal, as second tier in EU affairs, the envoy seems to be pointing to a looming crisis. Italian diplomats are privately critical in castigating aspects of Macron foreign policy across the Mediterranean. In isolating Turkey, grandstanding in Lebanon, and taking the side of the Benghazi warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya, France has effectively worked against EU and UN initiatives for peace and stability, they say.
Draghi is likely to be at the heart of EU strategy for the next year at least. It’s even been suggested that the election to the presidency could be delayed for a year, with Mattarella staying on for an extra year or 18 months in a brief second term, to be sure that Draghi takes up the post. However, this is unlikely; Sergio Mattarella doesn’t want to hang on. Another answer is to elect a respected figure to the presidency who would allow Draghi to carry out the reform programme until April or May 2023.
A likely choice might be Paolo Gentiloni, a former prime minister and foreign minister, now serving as Economics Commissioner in Brussels. The problem is that in vacating the post to return to Rome, Gentiloni would have surrendered Italy’s hold over the hugely influential economics portfolio.
Whatever happens, Draghi faces the most significant year of his career, for himself, Italy, Europe and maybe even the global community.