Negotiating a bespoke relationship with the EU was never going to be easy. The tragi-comedy of the last two years has made this abundantly clear. Is it any wonder than Michel Barnier has come to regard his UK counterparts as the cast of a particularly exhausting Whitehall farce?
But the foolishness and naivety of our political leaders is something we can reflect on in the years to come, when we finally know what happened. For now, what is required as a matter of urgency is that we fall back to first principles and defend them with whatever skill and determination we can muster.
To help understand where we are, how we got here and where the way out might be found, I invite you to consider the following.
First – what the UK said it was looking for on the day it invoked Article 50:
• free and frictionless trade with the EU outside of the Single Market and Customs Union
• the freedom to negotiate our own trade deals with non-EU states, such as the U.S., China, India, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea
• continuing membership of those EU agencies and funds that benefit us (e.g. Europol, Euratom, Galileo, the European Space Agency and the Erasmus student exchange scheme)
• easy access for British citizens wishing to enter the EU and the continued protection of our people (mostly retirees) living in Europe and EU citizens living and working in the UK
Two – what the UK wants no part of:
• laws that permit the free movement of labour, meaning large-scale immigration, mainly from the former East Bloc
• the Common Agricultural Policy (wasteful) and the Common Fisheries Policy (unfair to British fishermen)
• the imposition of rules and regulations by Brussels that ought to be the responsibility of the UK parliament
• the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
• the Northern Ireland backstop (to which we signed up last December and confirmed in March, with the secret proviso, known only to us, that it would never happen)
• paying £13 billion net each year into the EU budget
Three (as an aide memoire) – what Britain had already secured prior to the Referendum:
• permanent exclusion from the Single Currency
• a permanent opt-out from the Schengen Agreement on open borders
• a 33 per cent rebate on its annual budget contribution
• a written derogation from any further moves towards Ever Closer Union
In response – here is what the EU can offer:
• Canada Plus, to include the backstop on Ireland
• membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade
Association (Efta) outside of the Customs Union
• No Deal, leaving the UK as a third country, like Brazil or Russia
• Continuing British membership following the Banksy-like shredding of Article 50
Some realities have to be taken onboard and accepted. Those who cling to the demand that Britain must “take back control” of its borders have to accept that cutting back significantly on EU migration will have to be balanced by an increase in the number of immigrants from elsewhere, most obviously the developing world. Britain’s skills-shortage could (who knows?) be resolved over the next 20 years, but for now even Nigel Farage accepts that if the NHS and other vital services are to continue to function, and if factories, farms and the transport sector are to maintain current levels of efficiency, qualified immigrants are not a luxury, but an absolute necessity.
That said, immigration remains an emotive issue. Racism is part of the issue, but so is the feeling among the white working class that the English in particular are on the way to becoming a despised minority in their own country.
Free and frictionless trade cannot be agreed without Britain becoming a member of the EEA and Efta, which – in spite of the fact that it would free us to conduct our own third-country trade talks – is apparently out of the question. Mrs May and her hard Brexit opponents don’t share many red lines, but the EEA and Efta are one of them. For his part, Barnier has made his position absolutely clear. There can be no free access to the market without membership of the market, and, with the support of Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, it is highly unlikely this will change.
Thus, the prime minister’s Chequers plan, unless bent out of shape to conform with EEA status, is bound to fail. A solid Canada-Plus deal, establishing largely tariff-free trade in goods (though not services) is very much on the table, but Theresa May says no to this. Only if she is replaced or wakes up one morning soon with a startlingly different outlook, can meaningful progress be made.
Without free access to the Single Market, long lines of trucks at Dover and Calais are certain. The Tories deny this, but have been unable to come up with any convincing argument to support their optimism. Meanwhile, studies are underway on both sides of the Channel to cope with the expected congestion.
On the question of the Irish border, little or no progress has been made. Britain considers the border an entirely practical matter, to be resolved by some form of virtual customs checks. The Irish, supported by Brussels, consider this magical thinking. They believe that any re-establishment of a physical barrier across the island of Ireland will result, at the very least, in increased tensions and, at worst, in a return to Republican violence. It hardly matters whether they are right or wrong. It is their stated position, and Barnier agrees.
The trade aspect of any new border is fundamental to this. As things stand, commerce between the two parts of Ireland is entirely free (and frictionless). Should Brexit be achieved without UK membership of the Customs Union or Single Market, or without NI, by way of the backstop, remaining subject, on its own, to EU regulation, the resulting land frontier is sure to be an obstacle to trade and a source of intense irritation to everyone buying and selling across the two jurisdictions. In responding to this, Brexiteers need to remember that it is Britain that is leaving the EU (after 45 years of joint UK-Irish membership), not the other way round.
If it is bizarre that no one in the British Government ever saw the Irish issue coming, equally strange has been the sudden rediscovery by the Tories of their long-lost Unionist credentials. The most likely explanation for the latter phenomenon is not that the Conservative Party has renewed its common cause with the Orange Order, still less the DUP, but that it fears the knock-on effect of any perceived move towards Irish unity on demands for Scottish independence. It is doubtful that the average Brexiteer-in-the-street shares this concern. The real question therefore is this: are the British people – meaning the English – willing to sacrifice Brexit for the sake of the Union, or would they, when push comes to shove, rather cut Ulster adrift?
It sounds melodramatic, and it is. Northern Ireland, DUP and all, could well be the issue that decides the long-term survival of the United Kingdom. Elizabeth I and James I and VI have much to answer for.
There would be a cost, of course, to remaining inside the EEA. Nothing is for nothing. We would still have to support the operation of the Single Market, as well as those pesky agencies and funds of which we are all of a sudden so fond. But we would no longer have to pay into the Customs Union, the agriculture and fisheries budgets or the budgets of the EU’s regional development and international development funds. Nor, beyond the terms of the withdrawal agreement, would we have to concern ourselves with the maintenance of the institutions, including their 42,000 civil servants and contract staff. The Irish Question would be resolved at a stroke and Liam Fox would be free to enter into talks with the 167 countries in the world that are not part of the EU and are reportedly gagging for free trade with Britain.
On the downside, upon leaving the EU, Britain would immediately, and permanently, lose its voice on the European Council, which takes the big political decisions, as well as its seats on the European Commission, Court of Justice and Parliament. In respect of those parts of the the acquis to which we still subscribe, we would be bound by regulations and judgments promulgated in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg without British participation. No doubt an enhanced UK mission to the EU would lobby hard for British interests, but in the end it would be Europe that had the final say.
The same, it should be noted, would be true in the event of a hard or No-Deal Brexit. Pulling out of existing arrangements wouldn’t grant us an open door into the European market. On the contrary, the line drawn down the English Channel would inhibit trade for years to come. “WTO Rules Okay” may be the slogan of the European Research Group, but it is not one that has been adopted by British exporters, or, as it happens, the Daily Mail.
Why are we doing this? What is the point? We could argue about that until the cows come home. What can be said with a high degree of certainty is that a bad Brexit will be a millstone round Britain’s neck for a generation, and the only way to achieve a “good” Brexit at this, the eleventh hour, is for the Government to demand only what is possible, not what hardliners like to proclaim are the sine qua nons of sovereignty.
We should tell Barnier that we have decided to stay in the EEA and Efta while maintaining our membership of Europol, Euratom and all the rest. The “good bits,” if you like. This would give us much of what we’re asking for, though not everything. We would even, by golly, be able to join EU passport lines. What’s not to like? We should accept the compromise and be grateful, or at any rate, relieved.
You know the alternatives. Either we accept No Deal and head for the exit, heads held high, to the music of Elgar, or we organise an emergency second referendum, so that the British people can say yes or no to whatever emerges from the last-gasp talks about to get underway. We’ve seen where mindless stubbornness is likely to lead – straight to the abyss. The world can hardly believe what a horlicks we have made of the last two years. Let’s not see if we can’t plumb the depths even further.