Germany’s re-routed foreign policy path

The Germans have a word for it….Zeitenwende. The official government translation of the word into English is ‘watershed’ but the sense of it is that it describes a historical shift in geopolitics.

Last year, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a ‘Zeitenwende’ in German foreign and security policies. It certainly marked an intense and, at times, angsty debate about decades of underfunding the military and overfunding Russian gas and oil companies. The German government is finding how to react to it as difficult as defining it, as this week’s long-awaited publication of the country’s first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) document shows.

The 76-page document is the culmination of that debate and an outline of what Scholz said was a “big, big change in the way we deal with security issues.” It names Russia as “for the foreseeable future, the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area” and recognises the need to continue to reduce Germany’s reliance on rivals for its energy needs and raw materials. Prior to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Germany relied on Russia for half of its gas imports which has hampered its efforts to stop energy trading with Moscow.

The NSS envisages a proactive “robust” defence strategy concentrating on deterrence. Defence spending will rise to 2% of economic output but “as an average over a multi-year period”. The caveat is to take into account initial spending from the 100-billion-euro funds set up last year.

China is referred to as “a partner, competitor and systematic rival”. It’s an interesting formula. It acknowledges Germany’s nervousness about China’s threat to global security and simultaneously its industry’s requirements for critical minerals and mass market for its exports. China is Germany’s most important economic partner with trade between them worth $325 billion annually. 

Mercedes Benz, BMW, and Volkswagen have all warned about the dangers of severely reducing links with Beijing. They all know that the Chinese car industry is about to explode onto the world scene, and they need the metals China has in order to keep up. That anxiety was behind Chancellor Scholz’s trip to Argentina last month to secure a longer-term flow of lithium for the German car industry by helping Argentina build lithium refining plants so that it doesn’t need to send the material to China. Scholz can reassure industry that ties are not being broken with the main supplier (China), and that he’s working on a Plan B.

The buzz phrase around the debate in Berlin and other capitals is “de-risking not decoupling” as there is a recognition that creating new supply chains for critical materials will take years. Hence punches are pulled in the document. It states the obvious, that China is aggressively using its economic might to reach political goals but makes no mention of Taiwan. This may be because high level talks between German and Chinese government officials will be held in Berlin next week and Chancellor Scholz has no wish to provoke Beijing.  A new China specific strategy document had already been delayed due to infighting within the government coalition but is expected late next month.

Opposition leader Friedrich Merz described the NSS as “anaemic” and having “no value, no substance, no significance,”. That’s a little harsh. The document demonstrates the conceptual strategic distance Germany has travelled in 15 months. As Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party said, “In future, we will focus more on security when it comes to decisions on economic policy”. It states that NATO remains the cornerstone of German and European security although it also leaves the door open for greater EU military cooperation. It states that sustainability and combatting climate change are among the pillars of the future strategy.

However, there are weaknesses. There is no concrete plan of action or information about where the German military believes it may find itself operating. There’s also little detail on how the more robust military will be funded, and the idea of creating a National Security Council similar to the US and UK versions appears to have been dropped. This vagueness is probably intentional. The lack of detail allows Scholz to keep his options open and decision making on foreign policy within the Chancellery thereby retaining more power for himself and his Social Democrats rather than delegating it to the Greens.

Nevertheless, the NSS is a declaration that Germany recognises its foreign policy can no longer revolve only around trade while ignoring the defence dimension, hence promises to build a ‘world class military” and the increases to the military budget.

How fast they press ahead with all this depends on the degree of focus which must come, overcoming coalition government infighting, and bringing a sometimes sceptical industry with them. If not, then Berlin would talk the talk but do little walking. There’s a word for that as well – ‘Ausfluchte’ – prevaricate.

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