Putin’s Kherson retreat is an abject logistical failure
Behind the simple aphorism “An army marches on it stomach” is the complexity of military logistics. Russia’s miserable failure to get this right, and Ukraine’s ability to compound those failures, lies behind what looks like Russia’s humiliating retreat from the city of Kherson.
The logistical ineptitude of the invading forces became apparent within days of them crossing the border on 24 February this year. By the summer it was clear that efforts to rectify supply chain inefficiencies were not working. By contrast, the flow of long-range artillery weapons as well as modern small arms and equipment from friendly countries into Ukraine quickly overcame various transport difficulties and they made their way to the front lines. By mid-September the Russian forces were routed in Kharkiv Oblast in the north-east. During the chaotic retreat they suffered heavy losses in men and equipment.
The Ukrainians realised they could capitalise on this discrepancy in logistical ability to try and gain an even more important strategic prize – the southern city of Kherson. Russia’s troops in Kherson Oblast were mostly supplied via the road and rail bridge over the Kerch Strait from Russia into occupied Crimea and then on to Kherson. After the bridge was attacked on 8 October the route became much more difficult and latest estimates are that the bridge won’t be fully operational for almost a year.
The Russians responded by supplying their forces in southern Ukraine using the train lines which run north to south from the Donbass region. So in recent weeks the Ukrainians have been attacking the areas near the railway lines with some success. They recently smashed the 155th Brigade near Donetsk with the brigade losing 300 troops in just four days and then took the town of Pavlika which put them in even closer range of the rail tracks.
The Ukrainians are being cautious about the Russian announcement that they have left Kherson. They fear they are being lured forward into urban fighting with some Russian troops left behind to harrass the advance and plant mines and booby traps. However, when they reach the city-centre, Ukrainian soldiers will be greeted with the sight of several colourful billboards proclaiming that Kherson would be forever a Russian city which were erected on the order of President Putin after the illegal annexation of the Oblast.
Losing the only regional capital his forces have captured would be a bitter blow to Putin’s original war aims. It is on the route through to Mykolaiv and the major Black Sea port of Odessa. Without holding Kherson, a land invasion of the Black Sea coast looks impossible. The wider Kherson region, which is about the size of Belgium, controls the roads into Crimea and is home to the North Crimean Canal which is the main supply of fresh water for Crimea.
A collapse in Kherson could spark a headlong retreat by Russian forces which would put the Ukrainian military in a position to try and sweep through the rest of the relatively unpopulated Kherson Oblast, overrun several major ammunitions dumps, cut the water supply to Crimea, and arrive at its “border”. That would spark a political crisis in Moscow and pressure to cut losses and sue for peace.
That’s something the man at the top is desperate to avoid. Putin needs Russian troops to remain in Ukraine if he is to remain in the Kremlin. He needs to buy time. Russia’s National Security chief Nikolai Patrushev was in Tehran this week asking for more Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. These will continue to be fired into civilian areas to try and destroy Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and send more refugees westwards. On the front lines the ground is becoming muddier as each day passes and, in a few weeks, will freeze. The fighting may lessen in ferocity and Putin can spend the winter wondering what to do next.
So, with the Ukrainians advancing towards Kherson, taking dozens of villages along the way, and interrupting Russia’s supply routes, it looks as if the High Command has decided to avoid a defeat similar to Kharkiv, even at the price of an embarrassing withdrawal. The city sits on the western bank of the Dnipro River. By pulling up to 30,000 troops across to the eastern bank in a controlled manner, and then blowing the bridges, commanders can build defensive lines which are reinforced by the river and marshland. By doing so, the experienced combat troops in units from two of Russia’s Airborne Assault Divisions, and other elite formations, can be preserved to fight another day to hold what they still have, and their senior commanders might buy time to learn how to move X from Y to Z.
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