Serbia-Kosovo could be the next frozen conflict to slip into war

What prevents another war between Serbia and Kosovo? Just one thing – the presence of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers. To underline this, last Sunday the UK announced it is sending an extra 200 British troops to join the 400 already deployed in Kosovo. 

The decision followed months of tension in the border region culminating in an attack last week by 30 heavily armed ethnically Serb militiamen against Kosovan police officers in which one policeman and three militiamen were killed. Serbia raised the combat readiness of its military forces and sent units toward the border in what the U.S National Security Council, described as an “unprecedented staging of advanced Serbian artillery, tanks and mechanized infantry units.” American diplomacy swung into action. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan were quickly on the phone to Belgrade and Pristina trying to calm the situation and most Serbian forces returned to normal activities.

The swift request from NATO for the UK to send extra troops underlined how concerned alliance members are about the potential for wider instability during the Ukraine war. A snapshot of what could happen between Serbia and Kosovo, or between the factions in Bosnia, was seen in the Caucasus last month. Azerbaijan’s military advanced into Nagorno-Karabakh, causing ethnic Armenians there to flee en-masse. Russia, usually an ally of Armenia, could have signalled to Azerbaijan not to attack, or could have come to the aid of the ethnic Armenians. It chose not to for several reasons: Moscow is a little busy at the moment, it is engaged in renewed discussions with Azerbaijan over the creation of an ‘International North-South Transport Corridor’ and it has viewed Armenia’s increasingly warm relations with Western countries with some hostility.

There’s no evidence Russia encouraged this year’s spike in violence in Kosovo (including May’s riots by ethnic Serbs in which dozens of KFOR troops were injured) but Moscow would benefit from instability in the Balkans as it would distract the NATO powers, and potentially increase Russian influence. Moscow effectively bankrolls (and arms) the Republika Srpska region of Bosnia, and has a presence in Kosovo where it set up a Centre for Human Rights in northern Mitrovicia which is ethnically Serbian. 

Kosovo had been a province of Serbia for centuries during which time its population became overwhelmingly ethnically Albanian. It fought a war for independence in 1998 and the following year NATO intervened on Kosovo’s side and using air power drove the Serbian army out of the province. Tens of thousands of Serbs left with them. Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia in 2008 but Belgrade does not recognise Kosovo’s independence.

About 10 per cent of Kosovo’s population is Serbian most of whom live in the north near the border. They demand more autonomy, but the Kosovo government is reluctant to grant this fearing it would eventually lead to the Serb communities trying to merge their regions into Serbia. The EU brokered an agreement allowing local municipal councils to be established under Kosovan supervision, but the two sides cannot agree on the minutiae of how to set them up.  

The EU blames Kosovo for its intransigence but is not blind to the provocations of the Serb side and, if evidence emerges that the Serbian government was involved in last week’s attack on the police, censure will follow. The Kosovo authorities claim it was carried out with “the full support and planning of the Serbian state”, that the militiamen were trained in a Serbian military base, and that there is a plan to invade the northern part of Kosovo and annex it. 

Evidence for this is sketchy even if Kosovo’s Serbs would prefer to be ruled by Belgrade, and public opinion in Serbia still mourns the loss of the province which is regarded as the cradle of Serbian civilisation. The Serbian military probably could take the northern part of Kosovo, but they would have to go through a trip wire in the form of 4,500 NATO troops. Sending 200 soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment to take part in an annual exercise is simply warning Serbia that, if such a move is being considered, NATO will respond. It has said it will authorise more forces if required. 

In the aftermath of the 1999 war, there were about 50,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo. The now much-reduced number is thought to be enough to keep a lid on things despite periodic spikes in violence. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, has read the room and ensured relations with Western countries remain cordial. We are a long way from 1999 when Serbia and Russia were in lockstep, but Belgrade is bound to keep its options open and knows that if a situation ever arose where it could reclaim some of Kosovo it would take it, and Moscow would give what assistance it could.

This does not necessarily mean Belgrade and Moscow are behind the attack on the Kosovan police force. If Russia was somehow involved it is more likely via its connections with the Serbs in Kosovo who are dominated by hardcore nationalists. The Kremlin’s influence there is not as great as it is in Republika Sprska in Bosnia, but it has ensured it has at least a foothold in an area where it can make mischief and divert NATO’s focus on Ukraine. The best example of this is a look at the police force in Republika Srpska. It increasingly resembles an army and is equipped with heavy machine guns and armoured personal carriers courtesy of Moscow. 

The number of international peacekeepers in Bosnia has also fallen dramatically and would require boosting rapidly in the event of a deterioration in security. Nagorno-Karabakh showed how ‘frozen conflicts’ can heat up at a time of choosing. Russia is keeping its options open in the Balkans. 

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