We in the West have not been good at thinking through our relationship with Russia
Even a few days ago, a number of serious geopoliticians doubted whether Vladimir Putin would invade Ukraine. In their view, the costs of doing so would be too great. The Ukrainians would fight, hard and bravely. So Russia would face a heavy butcher’s bill, plus enduring opprobrium, plus lasting economic damage. Equally, the Russians had virtually incorporated Kazakhstan into their sphere of influence, an important strategic and prestige-enhancing gain. So why take risks in Ukraine, where the rewards would be much less bankable?
I found those rational arguments almost wholly convincing. But they were based on a premise which has been crumbling by the hour: that Putin would be guided by reason. Today, this is much less clear. For a start, he has a Duke of York problem (the Grand Old one, not the current holder of that title). “He marched them up to the top of the hill/ and he marched them down again.” What excuse could the Russian leader give for withdrawing his forces from the Ukrainian border?
Without in any way conceding the justice of Russia’s current claims, it is sometimes helpful to try to see the world through its eyes; in Wellington’s words, to work out what is happening on the other side of the hill.
For a start, the Russians have their own version of history, which sometimes intersects with what actually happened. They claim, correctly, that the Red Army broke the Wehrmacht. Side issues such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact can be left on one side. They also point out that they dismantled their Empire much more peacefully than the major European powers dismantled theirs. That is also true, though there is an obvious point. The best Western Empires brought benefits to their subject peoples. That was never the case with the Soviet Empire.
Finally, the root of the current quarrel, the Russians insist that although the Cold War is over, NATO is still an anti-Russian alliance. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary-General of NATO, said that its role was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. After its early successes, it was reasonable to allow that mission statement to evolve. Despite recurrent European ingratitude, we have been remarkably successful in keeping the US on side. As for the Germans, a bit more self-assertion would be acceptable, if it was matched by a higher contribution to Western defence. But do we need an anti-Russian alliance which extends into the former Soviet Union?
One problem here is that from the Yeltsin era onwards, we in the West have not been good at thinking through our new relationship with Russia. On the Right, there were hawks who hoped that their Cold War bonds would continue to pay dividends. Many other politicians were also thinking about dividends: the peace dividend. Theodore Roosevelt wanted to speak softly and carry a big stick. A lot of modern Europeans paraphrased that. Speak loudly, while beating the contemporary sticks – tanks and planes – not even into ploughshares, but into higher welfare budgets.
We should have negotiated a new system of collective security in Europe, with treaties guaranteeing frontiers and some reduction in arsenals; a Europe in which NATO would become steadily less important. That has not happened and the opportunity appears to have retreated over a distant horizon.
There is one obvious difficulty. Thirty years ago, the West had earned the respect of most thoughtful Russians, and increasing numbers of Chinese. We had won the Cold War. We seemed to know how to run an advanced society and they admired our self-confidence. Many of them felt that copying the West was the route to progress. Now that we have lost our self-confidence, that is no longer the case. Afflicted by doubt and decadence, we may have won the Cold War, but we are losing the snow-flake peace. Where formerly the Russians saw strength in many forms, they now scorn our weakness. Although they may be exaggerating this – we must definitely hope so – it will influence their policy-makers.
On our side of the horizon, the West has to hang tough, yet it is not clear that recent tactics are helping. Joe Biden, Liz Truss and Ben Wallace have vied with one another to threaten and shout. Is this wise? Megaphone diplomacy might help with various domestic electorates. But if the aim is to deter Russia from invading, it might be better to issue very strong warnings, in private. It should be made clear to the Kremlin that every sanction we could think of would be imposed. The absence of publicity might make it easier for Vladimir Putin to pull back, though the threats would have to be credible.
In the case of the US and the UK, they probably are. Biden cannot afford another display of weakness. In the scuttle from Afghanistan, the President made Jimmy Carter look like Theodore Roosevelt reincarnated. This time, Joe Biden would have to do better, while Boris Johnson might welcome a chance to use the word “defence” in the context of Western interests, rather than his own personal affairs.
But what about the Europeans? The Germans have become a liability. They seem to have lost interest in defence. Once the Russians hit at their gas supplies, they will be hopelessly unsteady on parade.
Given time, a young Henry Kissinger might have found a way through this mess. But time is closing in. Moreover, the Chinese will be watching. The Taiwanese ought to be at least as anxious as the Ukrainians.
Writing this on St. Valentine’s eve, one is forced to conclude that we may be on the verge of a new double-headed Cold War.