Ukrainians steel themselves for Putin’s Donbas blitz

“The Big Push”, that elusive grail of First World War generals, is looking increasingly imminent in Ukraine. When the war became almost static with the onset of winter, the lull facilitated endless speculation about a spring offensive, Russian or Ukrainian – or both. Two months ago there was growing suspicion that Vladimir Putin might have reverted to his original strategy and was planning an all-out dash for Kyiv, with forces based in Belarus and Russia.

However, there does not seem to have been a sufficiently large build-up of troops in the relevant areas to support that theory any more. The biggest concentration of Russian troops is in the Donbas, with large numbers now assembled in the Donetsk Oblast. The presumed objective is to complete the encirclement of Bakhmut, retake Lyman and advance on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk; the success or otherwise of such an offensive would thereafter determine the Kremlin’s further strategy.

Russia may well launch a complementary offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. Any such advance would probably be less heavy in manpower, but supported by helicopters and warplanes. Western analysts are reasonably confident about Russian intentions, since Putin’s problem is that nowadays it is almost impossible to conceal large-scale troop movements, due to satellite observation. Russia’s main forces are concentrated on the Donetsk front, so that is where the main thrust will be.

It is also the one area where Russia has made some modest advances – so modest that they amount to a few hundred metres per week, according to British intelligence analysis. That, combined with troops being based in snow-bound trenches, represents a return to First World War conditions. UK intelligence originating from PHIA (Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis), a post established in 2005 to end the era of dodgy dossiers, also claims that Russia lacks adequate munitions and manoeuvre units to support a sustained offensive.

UK analysts believe that, although many of the mobilised recruits arriving in Donetsk and Luhansk have been given standard infantry training, they have had no schooling at all in combined arms operations, which would have required education in brigade formations 2,000-6,000 strong, of which there has been no evidence in recent months. That suggests the Russians intend to begin the offensive with a combination of steamroller tactics, driving conscripts onto the Ukrainian guns, while Wagner and special forces units opportunistically exploit any weakness the carnage exposes in the Ukrainian defences.

So, short of munitions and personnel, driven by political demands, does this incipient Russian offensive not bear an uncanny resemblance to Hitler’s last throw in the Ardennes? Anecdotally, Putin is said to be prepared to tolerate as many as a million casualties in Ukraine; but does the same apply to the Russian people?

As to the timing of the Russian offensive, some observers speculate it will be launched on 24 February, the first anniversary of the present invasion, because the Russians are programmed to commemorate significant dates. Yes, they are; but why would they want to highlight, both to domestic opinion and the rest of the world, the fact that their “special military operation” has been bogged down for a year, when they initially expected to occupy Kyiv within a week?

Apart from logistical considerations, the timing of the offensive will depend, as it always has done, on the state of the ground. Realistically, it has already begun. Since early January the Russians, besides intensifying their assault on Bakhmut and taking Soledar, have begun a softening-up process against the neighbouring Ukrainian-held cities, with missile strikes against Kramatorsk and Konstantinyvka.

Russia’s use of missiles, however, has been instructive: the two S-300 missiles that hit Kramatorsk are designed to take down combat aircraft, but have crudely been repurposed to hit ground targets; and the Kh-22 missile that killed many people in Dnipro last month is intended to sink aircraft carriers. That betrays the fact that Russia is running out of missiles designed for the purposes its strategy demands.

But Putin still has large stocks of ballistic missiles and his ordnance is no less deadly for being used for purposes contrary to what its designers intended. This does suggest, though, that Russia now lacks an arsenal of accurate missiles and in a tightly contested offensive campaign, that could be a significant disadvantage.

So much for Russian offensives; what about the Ukrainians? Once already they have frustrated an imminent Russian offensive by launching one of their own. An advance towards Melitopol cannot be ruled out. But the wild card that the Ukrainians might just play, considering how creative their strategy has proved to be over the past year, is an offensive against Crimea.

On 4 February, a factory in the Borisovsky district of the Belgorod region, in Russia, went up in flames due to suspected sabotage. Since it was manufacturing structures for the repair of the Kerch bridge between Russia and Crimea, intelligence analysts are speculating over the significance of the attack: harassment, designed to prevent resumption of supplies by rail, or a preliminary to an offensive against Crimea?

Putin cannot possibly afford to lose Crimea, yet it is a real hazard for the Russian leader. Any serious Ukrainian advance towards the peninsula would require Putin to divert troops there, with the likelihood that his Donetsk offensive would then run out of steam. The Ukrainians have shown themselves past masters at surprising and frustrating the Russian military, themselves driven by the unrealistic demands of their political masters in the Kremlin, so that some such initiative cannot be ruled out.

The forces that Putin is marshalling for his Donetsk offensive should not be dismissed as raw recruits: they include the Wagner Group, Chechens, special forces and reasonably well-trained reservists. Their morale, however, is unlikely to be high; we know their command and control are abysmal; they are not adequately equipped, though Russia has brought forward large amounts of materiel, of unknown quality, which it has ineffectively attempted to conceal in forested areas behind the front line.

Western opinion might be dismayed to hear, in the early days of the offensive, of a steamroller effect of concentrated Russian manpower driving back Ukrainian defenders. From another perspective, that means thousands of Russian mobilised men being fed into the defenders’ meat grinder. In theory, Putin could reinforce depleted manpower by mobilising a further 500,000 men. The dangers of a domestic backlash, however, would be great, besides further undermining the Russian economy.

The Ukrainians, in contrast, are on home ground, defending their own territory: they know what they are fighting for. What they have most to fear is the dilatory conduct of Western powers in sending them the tanks they urgently need. That delay is a telling testimony to how far Western nations have declined into stifling bureaucracies. Every squadron of tanks potentially represents ground successfully held and lives not unnecessarily lost. What will it take for Western governments to compel their Jobsworths to throw away their clipboards and start loading armour onto transports?

Any assessment of a military situation is fraught with hazards; but, based on all available information and a reasoned assessment of the possible contingencies, it seems credible that Putin is headed for the climactic disaster of his own Ardennes offensive.

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