What’s Putin waiting for?
Ready, steady, wait! President Putin is waiting for something, but it’s difficult to see exactly what. If he does intend to order some form of invasion of Ukraine, he may be waiting for both the weather and the last cogs in the war machine to arrive. If he doesn’t intend to cross the border in force, he may still think there are concessions which can be forced from the West which is divided about how to respond to a revanchist Kremlin.
First the weather. It has been a relatively mild winter so far. The mechanised forces waiting on the border could advance much more quickly if the deep freeze sets in at the end of the month. They would then have up to six weeks before the ground softens again.
Next the cogs. The military build-up began last March with battalion tactical groups (BTG) arriving at the border, some from Russia’s Southern and Western Military Districts, some from as far away as Siberia. A Russian BTG is a flexible formation consisting of motorised troops or tanks with attached artillery, air defence, engineering, and logistic support units attached. Accompanying them were Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems. The Kremlin said they would remain there until the Zapad 2021 joint military exercises between Russia and Belarus ended in September. They’re still there along with special forces, airborne troops and armoured bridge-laying vehicles.
In the autumn the build-up continued. More BTGs arrived as did forces from the 1st Tank Army based in Moscow. With the heavy equipment mostly in place Russia can quickly deploy lighter units. This week forces and equipment began moving by rail from as far away as the Eastern Military District and included ground troops from the Pacific Fleet’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. Extra troop-carrying helicopters and attack helicopters have already arrived giving Putin more options if soft terrain presents a problem. Another joint Russian/Belarus exercise was announced and scheduled to last until 20 February. This will take Russian troops deep into Belarus meaning if they then struck south they could arrive behind the Ukrainian capital, Kiev.
Russian landing ships from the Baltic Fleet set sail and appear to be heading for the Black Sea. This would not only bolster any plans for an amphibious landing near Odessa, but it also means Kiev needs to think about sending troops south thus spreading their forces near the Russian border more thinly.
This does not look or feel like the usual “sabre rattling” by Moscow. If it’s a bluff, it’s a very expensive and time consuming one in which, if concessions are not given, could back Putin into a corner in which he risks a blow to Russian credibility unless he acts.
The scene is set for multiple military scenarios. 1. A limited incursion as “Russian Peacekeepers” enter only the parts of the Donbass region which are already occupied. This option was almost “greenlighted” by President Biden’s remarkable press conference this week in which he made a distinction between an incursion and an invasion and suggested the penalties by the West would be less harsh for an incursion. 2. An invasion to join the Crimea up to the occupied region thus cutting Ukraine off from the Sea of Azov. 3. The latter, plus taking the rest of the Donbass plus Odessa and the coastline to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. This would guarantee fresh water supplies to Crimea whilst also turning what was left of Ukraine into an agrarian based economy. 4. All the latter as well as driving westwards and southwards to Kiev and the Dnieper River and cutting Ukraine in half.
So, to the concessions. Most are non-starters. NATO could publicly state Ukraine will never join the alliance. Long range missiles will be withdrawn from the NATO countries which used to be in the Warsaw Pact. NATO vessels will not go past a certain line in the Black Sea.
More plausible, but still unlikely – NATO could promise not to send/sell Ukraine any more weapons, for example the UK has a £1.7 billion military agreement in place. NATO could call on Kiev not to build any long-range missiles. Sanctions against Russia for the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea to be dropped.
Possible, but difficult, and unlikely to be enough – Ukraine could be persuaded to fully embrace the Normandy Format talks designed to solve the Donbass issue. Moscow would insist Kiev agrees that the region has “special status” within the country. Kiev could be persuaded to drop all charges against the pro-Putin Uranian oligarch, Viktor Medvedchuk and allow him to reopen the TV channels closed by Ukraine’s President Zelensky last year.
The first concessions are not going to happen. The second would be difficult to negotiate, there would be divisions within NATO, and Ukraine might not agree to being told what to do. The third might allow Putin to try and spin it into a diplomatic victory but having told his country that the wider issues are fundamental to the safety of Russia it wouldn’t be much of a face saver. A recent poll from the independent Levada Centre found that “Almost half of Russians (48%) believe that the United States and NATO countries were the initiators of the escalation in the Donbass… and 4% that it was Russia.”
Putin’s grip on the Russian media means those figures are not a surprise. On the one hand they mean he can count on substantial short-term support if fighting breaks out, on the other they indicate there may have to be substantial concessions made to prevent an invasion if he is not to lose face. We’re waiting.