What’s the point of the European Union?

Stalin’s famous put-down when asked to respond to a plea from the Vatican to ease up on his persecution of Catholics – “How many divisions has the Pope?” – might equally be applied these days to the European Union. 

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine well into its third month, the European Union, as a unit, has never looked less relevant. It is not so much divided as lacking in evident utility – the obverse of NATO. 

Not that there hasn’t been a lot going on. Hardly a day passes without some weighty pronouncement from Brussels. In March, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, and her counterpart at the European Council, Charles Michel, hosted President Biden – “dear Joe” – at a hastily convened summit designed to make them look like warlords.

More recently, following the example of almost everybody, von der Leyen managed a photo-op with Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv at which she informed the Ukrainian leader – no doubt to his great relief – that Europe was on his side. 

But really, when you come down to it, what has the European Union accomplished since the Russian invasion that was not in fact a pale reflection of what NATO and its members, led by the US, were already doing? 

In its latest intervention, the Commission set out its plans for a sixth round of sanctions against Russia, including a ban on imports of Russian oil and gas by the end of the year, only to run into a blizzard of objections from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary.  

The narrative in Europe has not been framed by Brussels. It has all been about the contributions of the continent’s nation states, led, arguably, by the UK at one end and Poland at the other. 

We have heard a lot about the hesitations of Germany (to do with its dependence on Russian oil); doubts that have arisen on the political extremes in Italy and France; the reluctance of Hungary’s Viktor Orban to denounce his friend Vladimir Putin; and the various failed attempts by France’s Emmanuel Macron to persuade Putin to call his troops home. But the message overall has been clear: the people of Europe and their elected governments are united in their support for the people of Ukraine. 

Sweden and Finland, both European Union members, look poised to give up their post-war neutrality and join Nato. Switzerland, which studiously refuses to join the EU and has avoided all foreign wars since at least 1815, felt sufficiently emboldened to send weapons and supplies to Kyiv in its hour of need. 

Norway, another non-EU country, has reversed its previously announced strategy of gradually reducing its extraction of oil and gas and is doing everything it can to help make up for the shortfall of supplies from Russia. 

Even Ireland, perched on the western edge of the continental shelf, is playing its part, providing homes for an estimated 25,000 Ukrainian refugees and re-opening debate on future membership of the Alliance. 

Everything listed above is national in character. Foreign and defence ministers in Europe’s capitals have, together with their diplomats, have never been busier. Their sentiment is shared, but the key decisions are being taken at government level. Brussels has proved useful in coordinating the aggregate response, particularly when it comes to sanctions and financial aid, but it is NATO that truly stands supreme. 

Triumphalists in the UK who have long argued that the Alliance is real and the Union a snare and a delusion are cock-a-hoop. All at once, Brexit looks to have been justified. When the chips are down, they argue, who are you going to call, NATO or the EU? 

But it is the wrong question. The EU is not a defence alliance. It has no army, no navy and no air force. And if it had, it would have been despite the strenuous and frequently voiced objections of successive British governments. It doesn’t even have a clearly-defined foreign policy. What the European Union is, in fact, is a highly developed trading and standards bloc, which happens to promote a single currency and entitles its citizens, with a common passport, to live and work freely within its frontiers. 

True, there are forever murmurings of Ever Closer Union, to include some form of rapid reaction force. But until it gains responsibility not only for European defence, but for the police, the courts, prisons, health, housing, education, roads and railways, as well as culture and the media, to what extent is the Commission a government-in-waiting? 

Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Brussels had already been tested on another front on which it had only limited authority: the emergence and spread of Covid-19. Why didn’t it act quickly and decisively on vaccines? Why was Britain able to move ahead faster and to greater effect? The answer is that the relevant departments and agencies were underfunded and mainly concerned with education, food safety and the approval of medicines. There is no EU NHS; there are no EU doctors and nurses; there is no European “minister” with the authority to order lockdowns or make vaccination compulsory. 

When the pandemic began, Europe was wrong-footed. Von der Leyen promised much and delivered little. But the pace soon quickened. The relevant agencies were expanded and empowered to negotiate purchases not only of vaccines but of masks and PPE on behalf of all 450 million European citizens. At that point, it was left to the member states to do what they thought best. Three years on, the bloc as a whole has had outcomes similar to those in the UK. Lessons were learned that are sure to be applied during future pandemics. 

The global lesson from both the invasion of Ukraine and the impact of the pandemic in Europe is surely one of horses for courses. NATO is the clear choice when it comes to war and the threat of war. Nothing else comes close. At the same time, the EU is equipped to regulate trade, the internal market and environmental protection while encouraging economic development, international cooperation and the means of responding collectively to recurring threats, such as Covid, that transcend national borders. As for nation states, all the evidence suggests that these should be left to look after everything else that impacts them inside their borders. For all their failings, elected governments have a legitimacy that nothing else can match.  

It is possible, just, that post-Ukraine and post-Covid a new equilibrium will be found in Europe in which NATO, the EU and national governments are each given their due.  But for now, with NATO riding high and national leaders enjoying the rare sensation of responsibility and power, it is the would-be superpower that has lost ground. Only if and when it recovers its proper focus, can it hope once more to rise in the estimation of its citizens.