Why does Putin care about Belarus?

There are several theories about why Russia may have been involved in what was effectively the kidnapping of the Belarus opposition journalist Raman Pratesevich and his Russian girlfriend Sofia Sapega. All of them are underpinned by one rationale. President Putin needs to keep Belarus in Moscow’s sphere of influence, and at the moment that requires keeping President Alexander Lukashenko in power.

The four Russians on board the flight, diverted to Minsk after a bomb hoax, failed to reboard when the Ryanair jet was allowed to fly on to Vilnius. This suggests a joint operation between the Russian FSB and its Belarusian counterpart the KGB. The Belarusian version of events is that they didn’t know Pratesevich was on board, that they received a bomb threat, that they told several airports about it and, later, that the threat had been made by Hamas. Their story has holes you could fly a Russian Antonov cargo transporter through. No other airport appears to have been informed, the Lithuanians were told there was an altercation between passengers on board, and for once Hamas can be believed when it denied making a threat.

Minsk says a Belarusian fighter jet escorted the plane as it changed course. Given that the Russian and Belarusian air defence systems are integrated it seems unlikely Moscow was not involved in the decision to scramble a jet, if that indeed happened. Minsk has released an incomplete transcript of communications between air traffic control and the pilot. The pilot does not refer to a fighter jet but does repeatedly question the bomb warning…

Pilot: The bomb message.. where did it come from?

ATC: Airport security staff informed, they received e-mail.  

Pilot: Roger, Vilnius airport security staff or from Greece?  

ATC: This e-mail was shared to several airports

And later…

Pilot: Again, this recommendation to divert to Minsk, where did it come from? Where did it come from? Company? Did it come from departure airport authorities or arrival airport authorities? 

Controller: This is our recommendation.

Lukashenko is many things – a thug, a dictator, dull – but surely not such a dullard that he would hijack a plane from an EU country without informing Putin first. Both men must have known that sanctions would follow. That’s fine for Putin. He will be interested to see how far the EU and others can be pushed, and how far he can push Lukashenko to bend to his will. Although he cares neither for Lukashenko or Belarusians, he does care about the strategic position of Belarus.

Last August Lukashenko claimed victory in elections and extended his 26 years in power. Most observers believe his tally of 80 per cent of votes stretched credulity. Either way a wave of protests swept across Belarus but were brutally suppressed, resulting in opposition figures and journalists fleeing the country, among them Pratesevic. The EU, US, UK, and others condemned the repression. Russia assisted it.

Every Russian leader involves themselves in the immediate territories west of Moscow because it is mostly flat land through which Russia has been invaded, or through which Russian projects power westward. Putin will do what it takes to prevent Belarus from flipping into the Western sphere of influence as did Ukraine.

From Russia’s perspective, Belarus is part of a buffer zone between it and the west and southwest. Since the Cold War ended Moscow has seen NATO move up from positions 1,000 miles from St Petersburg to within 100 miles of the city. That NATO has no intention of invading is irrelevant in Moscow’s thinking. After all, times change.

Belarus is linked to the “Gap and the Gate”. The gap is the Suwalki Gap, also known as the Suwalki Corridor. Belarus lies on one side of it, and the Russian exclave of Kalingrad on the other. The gap is 40 miles wide and connects Poland to Lithuania. It is the only way NATO can reinforce the three lightly armed Baltic NATO states by land. A Russian military presence in Belarus could easily close the gap and cut off the Baltic states.

The “Gate” is the Smolensk Gate. It’s situated in Russia, near the Belarus border in the Dzwina and Dnieper river system and channels troops into a 40 to 50-mile wide area. If heading west it is the gate to Poland, if heading east, the gate to Moscow. The 1^ST Guards Army sits at the entrance. It is one of the best equipped armies in the Russian military and has more offensive equipment than NATO members Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Baltic states combined. In recent years it has conducted several simulated invasions of Poland.  

The Guards don’t need to move into Belarus as long as the country is in effect controlled by Moscow. If it looked as if it might go the way of Ukraine Putin would be tempted to cross the border on the pretext of supporting an “elected” government. 

Whether or not Russia was directly involved in the Ryanair hijacking, this is the rationale for Russian support of Belarus. This puts the western powers in a predicament. If they support the Belarus opposition to the extent that it looks as if the regime will fall, they risk triggering a huge crisis and possible strategic setback. However, they can’t be seen to do nothing about the behaviour of “Europe’s last dictator” as Lukashenko is often called. So, sanctions it is. Sanctions for electoral fraud, sanctions for hijacking a plane, sanctions for kidnapping. And what do these sanctions do? They push the regime further into the waiting arms of Moscow. 

Tim Marshall is the author of the million copies bestseller, Prisoners of Geography.  His new book – The Power of Geography: Ten maps that reveal the future of our world – is out now.