Putin puts the new Cold War on ice
Who are the Russians, and what do they want? It’s a question that has haunted politicians and journalists for time immemorial but, as events this week have shown, many are still no closer to finding an answer.
For weeks, Russia has been deploying tens of thousands of troops on its borders with Eastern Ukraine, as international observers warn that fierce clashes between Kyiv’s forces and Moscow-backed militants are worsening. Many Ukrainian politicians and their allies in the West have claimed the build up to be an indisputable sign that President Vladimir Putin had his heart set on an invasion of the Donbass. The Kremlin insisted, however, that its soldiers were just there to secure the border.
On Thursday, Russia’s intentions became slightly clearer. After overseeing massive wargames in Crimea, Defense Secretary Sergei Shoigu took the world by surprise when he proclaimed that the units stationed near the frontier had proven themselves “combat ready,” and would soon be returning to base. By the end of the month, he added, the withdrawal would be complete.
It remains to be seen whether the move will cool tensions in the region, which had risked boiling over in recent weeks. Kiev has pointed to the standoff as evidence that only NATO can guarantee its security and asked the bloc to step up its presence, including potentially flying warplanes near the Russian border. Having US armed forces on the country’s doorstep has long been a red line for Moscow, and their deployment would likely lead to a cycle of escalations.
Some Western commentators, too, seemed to work themselves into a fever pitch over the prospect of war. Among them was Anders Åslund, a Swedish economist who advised Boris Yeltsin’s government during its disastrous free market transition, and who has since become a Washington-based Fellow of The Atlantic Council. Åslund was roundly mocked on Twitter after declaring that the mood in Kyiv was one of “panic,” and residents were already searching for bomb shelters. Facing criticism from locals, he maintained that he only mingles with “elites,” and was therefore getting a different perspective. Predictions that neither Washington nor Moscow wants to risk a war between the world’s two foremost nuclear powers over Eastern Ukraine went largely unheeded in favour of “Putin wants war” headlines.
Likewise, rumors ran rampant that the Russian President would use an address to the Federation Council on Wednesday to announce a major response to recent US sanctions. Commentators traded theories that this could include the annexation of the two breakaway Donbass republics, or the announcement of a formal merger with troubled Belarus. Again though, Putin refused to live up to the hype, instead setting out his stall ahead of parliamentary elections with welfare and education spending. He steered clear of foreign policy, other than to insist that his country seeks friendly relations with all, while ominously warning that it would make any foreign aggressors ”regret their actions like they’ve regretted nothing before.”
If the scale of concern over the confrontation in Ukraine, and how quickly it appears to be fading out, has exposed some veteran Russia-watchers, the Kremlin again appears to have wrong-footed its detractors. The treatment of opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny, currently serving time in prison for fraud, has been a source of tension with the US and EU. The anti-corruption campaigner announced a hunger strike on 31 March, complaining that he had not been allowed access to his own doctors for back and spine pain. Media reports ran claims that Putin wants to see the opposition leader dead, while Western capitals warned of fresh sanctions if anything were to happen to him while protesting against his treatment.
Thousands took to the street for a series of unauthorised protests across the country on Wednesday, following Putin’s speech. But while activists demonstrated they could drum up support in a range of remote cities, rather than just the capital, their numbers were far lower than the previous demonstrations that took place following Navalny’s arrest in January. Surprisingly, nearly half a million people had expressed their interest in participating via a website set up by organisers, but only a tiny proportion of them turned up on the day.
By and large, the marchers were also peaceful, even jovial, with many genuinely perplexed that riot police did not disperse the crowds, opting instead to simply keep them away from government buildings. While footage of some violent episodes later emerged from St Petersburg, which saw some of the fiercest skirmishes in January, the numbers of arrests were still small by comparison. Unauthorised rallies are banned under the country’s current pandemic-prevention laws, but those present were all the more intent on making their concerns for Navalny’s health known and demanding he be allowed to see his doctors, rather than the standard prison service physicians.
On Thursday though, opposition-leaning outlet Mediazona, one of the most popular Kremlin-critical news sites, reported that Navalny’s legal team had confirmed the opposition figure had actually been given permission by penal authorities to be seen by private doctors as requested two days prior, and the medics were urging him to end his hunger strike. This fact had somehow not been made public previously, despite Navalny meeting with his lawyers and giving them a message to post online on the morning of the planned demonstrations. On Friday, Navalny confirmed he had been granted access to the medics and would begin ending his hunger strike. He chalked the outcome up to his supporters, despite the appointments happening before protests had begun.
Kevin Rothrock, editor of Meduza, another Russian news site frequently critical of the government, wrote that “I find it a little weird that Navalny didn’t mention [his medical care] in his statement released today on Instagram. Access to doctors was ostensibly the reason for yesterday’s protests, but it turns out he was granted exactly this — a day before the demonstrations.” It would appear that any consensus around Navalny as a unifying anti-Putin figure in the West may be crumbling, and his relevance in Western nations’ foreign policy may therefore wane, particularly if the situation soon quietens down.
While those predicting a new Cold War was imminent this week appear to have spoken too soon, there are still evident tensions. In the past few days, officials in the Czech Republic have expelled 18 Russian diplomats over allegations Moscow’s intelligence agencies were behind an explosion at an ammo depot in the country, back in 2014. They say the weaponry had been destined for troops in Ukraine, and claim spooks were behind it.
In response, Russia sent home 20 Czech envoys, a response that Prague has since described as “stronger than expected” and left them calling on other NATO countries to take reciprocal measures. Czechia’s foreign minister has warned that, unless the decision is reversed, more than 60 Russian embassy staff in Prague could be expelled. Diplomatic representation has taken a pummeling in recent weeks, nowhere more than with America, where both the Kremlin and the White House have recalled their ambassadors for urgent talks, leaving them without top-tier contacts at a time when tensions have been rapidly escalating.
Likewise, Putin’s relationship with Joe Biden got off to a rocky start, with the US President branding his counterpart a “killer” in an interview that sparked outrage in Moscow. Washington accuses Russia of being behind the poisoning of Navalny with the nerve agent novichok, attempts to interfere in the 2020 presidential election and the unprecedented SolarWinds cyber-espionage breach. Russia denies each of the charges, but has not escaped a new package of sanctions unveiled by Biden, with the expulsion of more diplomats thrown in for good measure.
The US President cut his teeth in politics as the dust was settling on the USSR, and NATO was expanding eastwards. Putin, meanwhile, was serving as a KGB officer in East Germany as the Iron Curtain fell. Though they played very different roles, both were intimately involved in the last Cold War. Only time will tell whether either wants to start a new one.
Gabriel Gavin is a Moscow-based journalist writing about Central and Eastern Europe for outlets including The Independent, The Spectator and The Kyiv Post.