The constant wave of cyber-attacks from Russia on UK political and commercial institutions is now “the new normal” according to Kevan Jones, the Labour MP and former minister, when introducing the long awaited Intelligence and Security Committee report into Russian interference in British politics.
The report could and should have appeared nine months ago, Jones and his fellow committee member, Stewart Hosie of the SNP, agreed. The excuses for delay from Downing Street were unacceptable and recent statements from the government were not true, they said.
The UK’s government departments, agencies and services, MI5 and MI6 especially, are not ready to handle the threat of Russian cyber-attacks on public institutions, the report warns.
There is clear evidence that Russia tried to influence the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 through a variety of means – disinformation, fakes news and conspiracy theories disseminated via social media.
Given what was known about Russian cyber activity in 2014, not least because of the disinformation offensive around the annexation of Crimea that year and the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region, the UK should have been forewarned. Yet neither the UK government of David Cameron nor the intelligence agencies appeared forewarned or forearmed when it came to the Brexit referendum of 2016. They should have been better prepared, says the committee.
They should also have investigated Russian cyber activity after the event. This became imperative, both Kevan Jones and Stewart Hosie argued, in view of the evidence of Russian interference in the American elections just a few months later, in the autumn of 2016.
Though there was evidently disconnect and dysfunctionality between the agencies, the failure to act and react to the likelihood of Russian interference is entirely the responsibility of the government. In the spring of 2017, the matter was raised at the Joint Intelligence Committee, the JIC. By that time Theresa May was in Downing Street and Boris Johnson was foreign secretary, ultimately responsible for the JIC. Following discussion of Russia and elections, no further actions or investigation were deemed necessary.
Quite how, where or when the Russians interfered in 2016, the committee could not say.
“The way the ballot works with pieces of paper for votes, is very difficult to interfere with – but the influences that lead up to the vote are different matter,” Jones said.
The whole system of tackling cyber interference is inadequate, the committee states. It calls for wholesale reform and would like one single authority, working through one prime agency, preferably the Home Security Service (MI5), coordinating the whole programme. At present cyber operations are the responsibility of more than half a dozen agencies, ministries and services, among them the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Digital Culture Media and Sport, the Foreign Office, GCHQ and the National Cyber Centre, MI5 and MI6, and the counter-terror police operations coordinated by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Committee JTAC.
Kevan Jones described the wiring diagram for cyber operations as “bewildering.” He and Stewart Hosie took the lead in presenting the report, since they had written it and the new chairman of the committee, Julian Lewis, had not.
In the name of the committee the two MPs called this morning for an immediate inquiry into Russian political interference in the summer of 2016 and its aftermath. Secondly, they called for an overhaul and streamlining of cyber operations. To this end the social media providers had to be called to account to do more to prevent malicious political activity. “They failed to play their part,” said Jones.
Two further needs for reform were highlighted throughout the report and today’s presentation: the need to expose Russian influence in Parliament, the House of Lords specifically, and the need to replace the Official Secrets Act. There are now a number of peers, it was claimed, paid to work for Russian business interests. Business, politics, and mafia networks are often connected, the report and today’s briefing made plain.
While a sitting MP in the House of Commons has to declare interests, fees and earnings of above £100, this rule for transparency doesn’t apply to the House of Lords.
The Official Secrets Act is inappropriate for the cyber age and should be replaced altogether. “It is not even illegal to be a spy in this country,” the MPs claimed.
In the opening chapters, the report sets out priorities:
“The Intelligence Community must be given the tools it needs and be put in the best possible position if it is to tackle this very capable adversary, and this means a new statutory framework to tackle espionage, the illicit financial dealings of the Russian elite and ‘enablers’ who support this activity.”
It adds that the threat from Russia must be tackled with consensus at home, and agreement across a broad front of international allies.
Russia, naturally, is having none of this. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, pre-empted the report’s publication: “Russia has never interfered in electoral processes in any country in the world.”
In paragraph 4, the report makes a tart riposte to the parallel system of values embraced by Putin’s Kremlin:
“The security threat posed by Russia is difficult for the West to manage as, in our view and that of many others, it appears to be fundamentally nihilistic.”