Save the European Union by splitting it in two
It is not every day that I agree with my colleague Gerald Warner of Craigenmaddie. But Gerald is right about Hungary. In reminding us here that that the Magyar people were given a wretched deal by the victors after World War I, and then further abused by the Soviet Union while being ignored by the West, he has set out the necessary historical background to Hungary’s present political dilemma.
You don’t have to approve of all the polices of the country’s newly re-elected prime minister to appreciate that, in seeking to redress the imbalance of history, Viktor Orbán has the support of the great majority of voters. What Hungarians want, above all else, is a leader who governs in the national interest, not that of the EU, the latest power bloc of which, perforce, it is currently a member.
I am not a fan of Orban’s. I am happy to accept that he is not in the mould of either Hitler or Stalin. He is not a monster, like the dictator of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, and he is certainly no more extreme than the present Polish leader, Mateusz Morawiecki, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz or Milos Zeman, President of the Czech Republic. But he is not, in the presently understood sense of the word, a Good European. He is a nationalist first, with roots (beyond those of the more distant past) in both the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Warsaw Pact.
The East Bloc is his natural home, looking not only to Moscow but, warily, to Istanbul, or Constantinople, as I’m sure he still thinks of it. To Orban, Brussels, as the capital of the EU and headquarters of Nato, is a necessary evil: the base on the one hand of a liberal tyranny that happens, conveniently, to be a cash cow, and on the other of a defensive shield until such times as better arrangements can be agreed.
In pursuing his doctrine of racial and Christian purity, Orban is swimming against the tide, believing that it will eventually turn, delivering him and his Magyar fellow citizens safely back to shore. He may even be right, though it is hard to imagine a Hungary that in 2050 does not once more contain a significant Muslim minority.
But that is not what I wish to talk about here. No, my sermon today concerns something more fundamental. What I propose is that the European Union, post-Brexit, should consider hiving off the former East Bloc nations into a subsidised but separate Eastern European Union, with its capital in Vienna. The EEU would be much looser confederation, based on cooperation rather than compliance, with defence at its heart, linked to the old EU via a shared customs union and single market. The border between the two blocs would be as strong as the two sides wish it to be at any one time, but with the proviso that freedom of movement stops at the common frontier.
A twice-yearly pan-European summit, with ministerial meetings on the side, would address outstanding questions. Trade would be government by bilateral treaties between the two groups, centred on what we must now call regulatory alignment, with an independent court of justice set up to resolve disputes. External defence and security would be addressed, as far as possible. as if the two were one entity.
To the West, the Western European Union, comprising France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, with the likely inclusion of the Nordic coutries, would go its own way, either towards ever closer union or, conversely, in the direction of a more relaxed confederation. Given that in either case the Single Currency would almost certainly continue, as well as freedom of movement, with the additional possibility of a WEU defence force, Britain might still opt to remain on the outside. Alternatively, it could apply for readmission, knowing that the European clock had been re-set and that it could emerge as a leading participant rather than a reluctant hanger-on.
The new Europe that would result would better reflect the sensibilities bequeathed by history. There would be issues, of course. The Balkan states might feel themselves isolated, as part neither of the West nor of the enlarged Visegrad Group. But an accomodation could surely be found, with Nato as the glue holding everything together. More generally, the East might argue that it was being shunted off into second-class status. In that case, it would be essential that the single market and customs union should continue to produce the goods. Vienna – let us call it that – could not complain that it had been disconnected from its cash cow and at the same time proclaim its separate identity, complete with a ban on non-Christian immigration. My guess is that the East would experience some tough times for a decade or so and then catch up with the West, which at the same time would rediscover the natural unity, with or without the UK, that defined the early years of the European Project.
How likely is it that any of this will happen? I have no idea. What I do know is that things cannot continue as they are, with the Visegrad nations emerging as a state within a state that is already grappling with the complexities of superstate existence. Decision time is fast approaching for the entire European continent that will determine the future prosperity and sense of well-being of more than 500 million people. It has to decide which way it wants to go. I know which way I would jump.