The least surprising news of the week is that the latest round of post-Brexit UK-EU trade talks has ended in stalemate. Since the end of January it has been evident that Brussels has failed to adjust to the new reality of a sovereign Britain no longer subject to its diktat. More recently it has also become obvious that the EU is similarly oblivious to the dramatic changes that will confront the world when it emerges from pandemic lockdown.

The European Union is still playing the same old games that formerly bolstered its power. Around the world, governments and people worry about a second pandemic wave, economic meltdown, massive unemployment, broken supply chains and even potential starvation. Meanwhile, the EU is stubbornly attempting to seize control of the UK’s fisheries in the hope of exploiting them as it did in the days of British subjection to Brussels, still promoting a “level playing field” and subordination of the UK to European law.

Michel Barnier, in his customary style of a headmaster deploring a disruptive pupil, on Friday described the talks as “very disappointing”. Testing the credulity of his audience to destruction, he added: “I am not optimistic in the face of British incomprehension.” Does Britain’s negotiator David Frost look like someone who is short on comprehension? His statement today was crisp, calm and bang on point.

“It is hard to understand why the EU insists on an ideological approach which makes it more difficult to reach a mutually beneficial agreement,” said Frost. “We very much need a change in EU approach for the next Round beginning on 1 June.  In order to facilitate those discussions, we intend to make public all the UK draft legal texts during next week so that the EU’s Member States and interested observers can see our approach in detail. The UK will continue to work hard to find an agreement, for as long as there is a constructive process in being, and continues to believe that this is possible.”

Barnier’s problem is that Frost comprehends all too well what the EU is trying to do to Britain and is having none of it. While publicly condemning the slow progress of the negotiations, the EU’s aim is to prolong the transition period by a further two years, to perpetuate its ability to destabilise Britain’s politics and economy.

Will Boris oblige? In February he was adamant he would not extend the transition period, but has the pandemic crisis unnerved him? Nobody yet knows. The conventional wisdom – the sentiment that has proved to be consistently wrong-headed since the Brexit issue first moved centre-stage – is that the coronavirus catastrophe makes it inevitable the transition period should be extended: with the British and global economies seriously damaged, it would surely be insane to shoulder the added problems of a likely no-deal departure on 31 December.

However, is the counter-argument not stronger? In the dystopian economic landscape of next January, possibly further blighted by a second pandemic wave, would anyone notice the relatively light sanctions incurred by moving to trade with the EU on WTO rules? Fans of the EU have greeted the stalemate in negotiations with the usual warnings about the threat to such amenities as “airline slots”? But how many commercial aircraft will be flying next January? And with what fury would the global community react to the EU deliberately disrupting travel and communications vital to recovery?

The geopolitical scene will probably have been radically transformed by next year. Who will be the American president by then? If it is Donald Trump he is likely to make much parade of offering Britain a trade deal, but on similarly tough terms as the EU. If it is Joe Biden, that will signal the return of the Democrat “back of the line” policy of the Obama era. If Trump returns, Britain must stand with him against China whose responsibility for this global disaster deserves to make it a pariah.

Everywhere, as lamented by Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, a pro-EU think tank, in The Guardian this week, new forces are emerging. Grant listed them as: de-globalisation, nation-first politics, tighter borders, anti-green backlash, east-west and north-south tensions (within the EU). The reality is that Brussels has much more to be concerned about than filching Britain’s cod.

In such circumstances, Britain extending the transition (begging Oliver-style “please, sir, can I have some more?” and signing a large cheque for the privilege of following EU rules with no say in their formulation) would be a pointless denial of post-Covid geopolitical realities. If a fair deal can be done between now and December, fine. If not, there is going to be so much change and upheaval to contend with anyway, regardless of Brexit, that Britain would be far better to get on unimpeded after calmly choosing a clean break if the EU continues in this fashion.