In the Cold War era of the 1950s to late 1990s, states that did not seek formal alignment with the United States or the Soviet Union – instead seeking to remain independent or neutral – formed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to avoid becoming pawns or proxies in the struggles between the major powers. Representing a loose coalition of mostly developing countries, and synonymous with the post-Second World War period, the NAM remains one of the largest international forums outside the UN and accounts for approximately 4.47 billion people – nearly 60% of the global population. However, over the past few years, the term Global South has been used interchangeably with the NAM to refer to this diverse group of countries.
Winning the hearts, minds and votes of the Global South to build a coalition of like-minded countries who support geo-political, geo-economic and geo-strategic objectives of traditional and non-traditional actors alike, has taken on a whole new impetus. While the West has been somewhat complacent in its engagement and slower to recognise the geostrategic imperative of doing so, China and Russia have not. In an increasingly interconnected and complex world driven by shocks such as conflict, technological transformations, climate change and economic uncertainty, 60% plus of the world’s population is understandably going to want a say in how these challenges are managed. The degree to which the “voice” of the Global South can or is willing to be influenced remains a question – but time is ticking.
Ukraine’s push for Global South engagement amid ongoing war and geopolitical disruption
Ukraine’s push for Global South engagement was prompted by the need to maintain and secure support in international multilateral forums, and to reduce Russia’s ability to finance the war by cutting off its trade connections and through sanctions. The invasion has exposed gaps in Ukraine’s foreign policy, prompting a search for a global engagement strategy as the war drags on.
Ukraine’s recent foreign policy has focused on the country’s Euro-Atlantic relations, to the detriment of global relations. While engaging the Global South has emerged as a key priority since the invasion, Ukraine has struggled to win the battle of narratives with Russia for three reasons: (1) Russia and its allies have an extensive network of diplomatic and economic relations across key regions where Ukraine was seeking to engage, including Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia; (2) many countries in those regions perceived the Russia-Ukraine war as a European one, far removed from their own political, security and socioeconomic concerns – but one that had an impact on food security and was prioritised for aid and assistance; and (3) Ukraine has been relatively poorly represented in many regions of the Global South for decades, meaning that it struggled to convey its message.
It should be unsurprising that Ukraine has not invested in broader global engagement. Balancing relations with hegemonic Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours on one side, and Euro-Atlantic partnerships on the other, has preoccupied the country’s leadership since independence in 1991. However, this has meant that in contrast to Russia, Ukraine lacks elite networks, diplomatic representation, foreign policy expertise and intelligence to convey its message and frame narratives effectively to reach key audiences across the Global South. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Ukraine is under-resourced, with many of its existing embassies in the Global South covering too many countries – further inhibiting effective diplomatic engagement and intelligence gathering.
Ukraine courts the Global South
Since the invasion, Ukraine has started to invest in advancing relations with the Global South. President Zelenskyy has repeatedly sought to address senior leaders, inviting African leaders to Kyiv to garner support for his peace plan. Ukrainian parliamentarians and foreign policy experts have sought to counter Russia’s false narratives on food security, and attract support for the peace plan, by engaging extensively overseas.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, and the MFA have also played a critical role. In October 2022, Minister Kuleba visited several African countries, including Kenya and Senegal – Ukraine’s first engagement at such a level in decades – and has since repeatedly returned to visit different countries across the continent. Ukraine is also planning to open new embassies in Africa; however, it is yet unclear whether it will be able to source staff with regional knowledge and expertise. Beyond Africa, in November 2022, Minister Kuleba joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit. This was Ukraine’s first such engagement with the bloc, but there is still some way to go before the country becomes an ASEAN Dialogue Partner – a step both Russia and China took in 1996.
Why Ukraine needs a long-term Global South strategy
As the Russia-Ukraine war drags on, budgets tighten, and tensions escalate in the Middle East, maintaining its push in Global South engagement will be an uphill battle for Ukraine. However, doing so is a crucial opportunity for the country to expand trade and economic ties in sectors such as digital and military tech.
Geopolitical and economic priorities will continue to shape the extent to which countries are receptive to Ukraine’s diplomatic overtures. Russia’s continued stronghold over elite relations and security ties mean greater engagement may not be an option in some countries. Some are ideologically opposed to the US and its allies, while others do not see the value in building relations.
Yet, there may also be unexpected opportunities. Cambodia, China’s key ally in Southeast Asia, has nonetheless supported Ukraine in its engagement with ASEAN. While this support is likely driven by Cambodia’s own desire to balance partners amid increasingly fraught US-China relations, it presents Ukraine with an opportunity. To be effective in the long-term, Ukraine’s foreign policy must be astute to these opportunities and be able to navigate complex dynamics in regions where – other than Russia – Eastern European countries have had little prior engagement.
Russia’s diplomatic offensive in the Global South
Russia has heavily invested in diplomatic engagement across the Global South, particularly in Africa, where the Soviet Union and its influence show no signs of waning. The continent, which accounts for 54 votes (around 25%) at the UN, has proved especially receptive to Moscow. During the March 2022 UN General Assembly vote calling for Russian troops to withdraw from Ukraine, only 28 of the 54 African countries supported the resolution.
Russia has been particularly successful in framing the war as a conflict between itself and the West, rather than as an invasion of Ukraine. So far, this message has largely won the “battle of narratives” shaping debate in the Global South, successfully leveraging the fond relations shared by many Global South states towards the legacy of the Soviet Union. Russian soft power narratives on alleged double standards and patronising attitudes from the West are received well in the Global South, which further feeds the Soviet narrative of supporting anti-colonial liberation movements. For example, statements such as “Ukraine is a puppet of the West”, which implies that Ukraine lacks agency and that the West is responsible for the war, have resonated with former colonies. This anti-colonial legacy does not necessarily offer itself to a pro-Russian stance. It has, however, contributed to reduced understanding towards the western position and, at times, frustration towards the West’s strong line against Russia.
Kremlin-linked business interests and false narratives
The use of false narratives has also been a contributing factor towards Russia’s success in the Global South when it comes to messaging about the Russia-Ukraine war – for example, their associating Ukraine with Nazism. Russian media has effectively exploited anti-western sentiment while simultaneously promoting its own alternative perspectives on the war. Reports of the mistreatment of African students at the start of the war heavily contributed to Russia’s early success in capitalising on anti-imperialist views. Russia has also used, to its benefit, the animosity surrounding rising food prices – a consequence of its war with Ukraine – which continues to impact regular citizens globally.
Russia’s vested business interests across the Global South also make it hard for countries to break away, enabling the country to retain its influence in Africa – which consists of strong security ties, arms sales, military training programs and more. Russia supplies over 40% of Africa’s arms market – with China accounting for 13% – and it is often favoured over American equipment as it is cheaper. The Russian private security company Wagner Group has also played a key role in guaranteeing security provisions for African leaders who are facing security challenges, and the company has been used to secure geopolitical influence and control across the region. This transactional association between Russia and state actors has been an additional mechanism ensuring continued support for Russia over the war in Ukraine. In the African case, this was most recently demonstrated in July 2023 when 17 African leaders travelled to Russia to attend the second Russia-Africa Summit, despite the risk of sanctions and tensions with the West.
Across the Global South, mixed responses remain over how to approach – and end – the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as the supply of weapons to Kyiv. Many Latin American leaders have made clear that they will not provide weapons or munitions to Ukraine. They continue to be hesitant about condemning Russia’s actions, and they have maintained a policy of calling for peace – stemming from the principle of non-intervention and self-determination which has deep roots in Latin America. Russia continues to take advantage of divides across the Latin American region to advocate its strategy and narrative.
China’s evolving relationship with the Global South
China’s engagement in South-South cooperation is not new, with a history dating back to the 1950s. Although the focus and rhetoric have changed through the decades, China has always placed a strong emphasis on its relations with the group of nations now often referred to as the Global South.
What is new is China’s desire to strengthen and institutionalise its strategic cooperation with the Global South on a range of international issues. Under President Xi Jinping, China’s commitment to South-South cooperation has grown both in terms of rhetoric and policy with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the creation of two new multilateral institutions: the New Development Bank; and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China’s engagement through these institutions and others covers a wide range of areas, from the ideological to climate change, international law and finance, security, food and energy security, and human rights.
Why is Global South engagement so important to China?
China’s engagement with the Global South is integral to its domestic, geopolitical and geoeconomic interests.
Firstly, engagement with the Global South helps China deliver on its domestic goals by creating a favourable external environment. In 2017, President Xi Jinping laid out his vision for doing this by: managing great power relations, securing China’s periphery, ensuring “cooperation among developing countries”, and “building a new model of international relations and a community of a shared future for mankind”.
Building this “new model of international relations” is a key reason for China’s engagement with the Global South. In a world of complex threats and risks, Beijing sees the need to enhance its international discourse power, establish new norms, amplify its voice in world affairs, and garner support for its strategic priorities.
China views the creation of regional organisations and initiatives as a testing ground for the export of its political and economic governance models, and as an opportunity to delegitimise the US by translating criticism of China into universal “historical wrongdoing of the West”. On 14 September 2023, China went a step further with the publication of the “Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance”, which outlined its vision for a China-led reform of the global governance system. China argues that these initiatives offer an approach to lasting peace, greater development, and closer cooperation in the world, as well as providing an important platform for deepening South-South cooperation.
Finally, China recognises that its status as a developing country is in part dependent on how it is perceived and accepted by the Global South, meaning it is particularly sensitive to criticism in the international arena.
With a projected GDP of USD 18 trillion for 2023, China’s status as a developing country is coming under increasingly vociferous opposition from all sides. Critics – largely from the US – argue that developing country status gives China benefits, such as lower annual UN budget assessments, access to international finance, and an unfair advantage in international negotiations.
It is not just western governments that criticise China’s positioning of itself as a developing country. Speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States in 2022, Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda Gaston Browne called on major greenhouse gas emitters, including China and India, to contribute funding to compensate poor countries for the consequences of climate change. Given this call, it is perhaps not surprising that China has gone to great lengths to reinforce its status as a developing country.
What’s next?
China’s steadily increasing diplomatic engagement, outward investment and lending over the past decades have created new development trends, built new institutional relationships and are being used to shape political discourses across the Global South. China uses its interactions with the Global South to reinforce its position as a developing country on key issues such as climate change and trade, whilst seeking great power recognition in other domains.
In doing so, China is seeking to forge a very different international architecture to what came before. How the Global South responds to this remains to be seen, but China’s state media and some western commentary around China’s engagement certainly implies that China has already won the battle for hearts and minds in the Global South. Such an assessment suggests that there is a common view amongst what is a diverse group of countries in the Global South, and looks past the agency each of these countries has when dealing with China. This – combined with political and economic engagement by Russia, India and the West – creates a complex web of alliance and non-alignment, which in turn shapes China’s presence, threat perception and engagement in the Global South.
One thing remains certain: where the West sees risk, China sees opportunity. Where the West seeks to reinforce the existing establishment, China is already creating new ones.
This briefing was prepared by ODI’s Global Risks and Resilience Geopolitical Advisory team.
Dr Rebecca Nadin is the Director of Global Risks and Resilience Geopolitical Advisory at ODI and the Head of ODI’s Global China 2049 initiative.
Olena Borodyna is a Senior Transition Risk Analyst in the Global Risks and Resilience programme.
Ilayda Nijhar is a Global Risk Analyst in the Global Risks and Resilience programme.
