The short and long term view for Gaza are both bleak
In dealing with the Gaza crisis, it is hard to move beyond two brief phrases. The first is Yeats: “great hatred, little room.” The second is contemporary and is almost a geopolitical rewriting of Yeats, from Dan Hannan. In response to any proposal to slow down the bloodshed, he has a question: “And then what?”
At the risk of moving from optimism to the uttermost shores of naivety, let us attempt to answer Hannan’s question. We need to arrive at a point when the Israelis can claim that they have drastically reduced Hamas‘s war-fighting capability, weakened its power-structures and eliminated some of its most dangerous leaders. Israeli troops would then withdraw while Gaza was handed over to new authorities: the PLO and Arab nations willing to take part, under the supervision of the UN, with the longer-term aim of free elections. By now, Netanyahu would have fallen from power, replaced by government of national unity which was willing to return to Oslo and reopen the road to a two-state solution.
There is only one problem with all that. Everything. The obstacles to achieving any part of it are immense. Admittedly, Premier Netanyahu has no political future. That said, not everything which he did was wrong. When he agitated against judicial activism, he had a point. It had become excessive. But many Israelis who were ready to believe that the judges were going too far were even more strongly convinced that Bibi could not be trusted with the rule of law. His sole remaining claim to authority was his competence as a securocrat. That reputation has been lost, irrevocably. Plenty of domestic critics are now claiming that his only interest in staying in office is to avoid going to gaol. It does seem likely that in the medium-term, he will be spending more time with his lawyers.
In the short-run however, the fighting is likely to become more intense. Degrading Hamas’s powers of resistance will mean dealing with urban warfare, always a messy business which is bound to mean heavy civilian casualties. It also means tackling the tunnels, a dangerous form of warfare which will inevitably involve serious Israeli losses as well as imperilling the hostages. Many of them are bound to be killed.
Even if the Israelis can claim a victory at the end of all that, the national mood would not be well-disposed to peace. The same will be true in the Arab states. Plenty of rulers and ruling elites have little time for Hamas, but on many Arab streets, they will be regarded as heroes (as they appear to be in far too many British streets). No new Gaza leadership will feel comfortable if it arrives in power on the back of an Israeli tank.
Throughout the world, there are calls for a cease-fire, mostly from those who give the impression that they would be astonished if the calls were heeded. But the Israelis should also heed the Hannan question. In 1982 and 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon to crush terrorist foes. In both cases, it took much longer to achieve a partial success. In 2006, indeed, it could be argued that the attack on Hezbollah was a strategic failure.
One key to a favourable outcome is to see a way out. During the nineteenth century, on the North-West frontier, British troops often had to deal with incursions from Afghan tribes. In almost every case, the authorities restricted themselves to ordering a punitive expedition. They had seen what happened if there were attempts to occupy the whole country, and would have agreed with Condolezza Rice’s much later comment: “Afghanistan is where great powers go to die.” Instead, nineteenth Century British generals moved in, made their point, and then got out. “Butcher and bolt” as it was known at the time.
At present, we are only seeing the butchery and can only fall back on the Psalmist at his most plangent. “How long, O Lord…how long.”