After 20 years of US-led intervention, the swift Taliban takeover in August 2021 returned Afghanistan to the control of a regime known for its oppressive governance and shaky legitimacy. Now, this regime is turning its attention to military modernisation, seeking to build a more stable defence force—particularly in air defence. To help with this objective, the Taliban has set its sights on an unlikely partner.
Russia, the northern invaders they once fought as insurgents in the 1980s, has become a potential supplier of advanced military equipment. This emerging relationship is significant, not only because of the history between the two but because of the broader geopolitical implications for Afghanistan, Russia, and the region.
The relationship between the Taliban and Russia is fraught with historical baggage. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in a war that lasted nearly a decade. The Afghan mujahideen, of which the Taliban were a part, fought against Soviet forces, receiving support from the US and its allies in what became a Cold War proxy battle. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989 played a significant role in the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving a legacy of hostility between Russia and the Afghan insurgents.
Fast forward three decades, and the dynamics have shifted. Russia, once an adversary of the Taliban, is now adopting a more pragmatic stance toward the group. With the US and NATO no longer a presence in Afghanistan, Russia has positioned itself as a regional power broker, concerned with the spread of instability and terrorism across Central Asia. For the Taliban, Russia represents an opportunity to fill the void left by the West’s departure, providing potential diplomatic and military backing.
Russia’s engagement with the Taliban is not merely ideological, in that they both oppose the West, but also strategic. In recent years, Moscow has sought to strengthen its influence in the region, using Afghanistan as a platform to extend its reach into Central Asia. At the same time, Russia views Afghanistan as a potential security threat, fearing that instability in the country could spill over into its neighbouring states or embolden extremist groups that might target Russian interests.
One area where Moscow could assist the Taliban is in military modernisation. Afghanistan’s air defences, which were never robust to begin with, have been left in tatters after decades of conflict. The Taliban, seeking to rebuild its military infrastructure, is particularly focused on acquiring advanced air defence systems. To that end, they have turned to Russia—a country known for its expertise in missile technology.
In a revealing interview with Russia’s state-run Tass news agency on August 29, 2023, General Sayed Abdul Basir Saberi, of the Ministry of Defense, confirmed Afghanistan’s intention to procure Russian-made air defence systems. Saberi lauded Russia as “the most advanced country” in air defence technology, suggesting that the Taliban hoped to strengthen ties with Moscow in order to secure sophisticated weaponry. This public overture followed months of quiet diplomacy, during which the Taliban had been courting Russian support. The regime’s interest in bolstering its air defences had already been signalled in 2023, when Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, the Taliban’s army chief of staff, acknowledged the necessity of anti-aircraft missiles. However, at that time, the Taliban had not laid out a clear procurement strategy.
The timing is no coincidence. In May 2023, the Taliban was invited to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a move that underscored Moscow’s willingness to engage diplomatically with the regime. While the St. Petersburg forum focused primarily on economic cooperation, the Taliban likely viewed it as a stepping stone to deeper military ties.
Despite the Taliban’s enthusiasm, there are significant obstacles to any arms deal between the two. While Russia has displayed a willingness to supply weapons to non-state actors—such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—arming the Taliban presents unique challenges. Advanced air defence systems, such as the Pantsir or Tor missiles, are not easily integrated into a military force that lacks the requisite technical expertise. The Taliban does not have the institutional infrastructure necessary to operate and maintain such complex systems.
Furthermore, Russia’s capacity to deliver advanced military equipment has been severely diminished by its ongoing war in Ukraine. The conflict has drained Moscow’s military resources, with Russian forces suffering significant losses in personnel and equipment. As a result, some analysts doubt that Russia is in a position to supply sophisticated air defence systems to the Taliban anytime soon.
Pavel Luzin, a non-resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, expressed scepticism about General Saberi’s claims, dismissing them as “sweet talk” designed to flatter the Kremlin. Luzin pointed out that Russia, while historically generous in providing weapons to allies and proxies, is currently preoccupied with replenishing its own military stockpiles, making it unlikely that Moscow could meet the Taliban’s demands in the near term.
Even if Russia were willing to provide the Taliban with advanced air defence systems, the logistical challenges would be immense. Air defence systems are not merely a collection of missiles and launchers; they require a sophisticated infrastructure to operate. Radar installations, communications networks, and highly trained personnel are all necessary components of an effective air defence system. The Taliban, having spent the past two decades fighting a guerrilla war, lacks the technical capacity to manage such a complex military apparatus.
Training Taliban forces to operate these systems would be a time-consuming and expensive process, one that Russia may not be willing to undertake. No intermediary exists in Afghanistan, meaning that any arms deal would likely involve direct Russian involvement in training Taliban personnel. Given the Taliban’s history of extremism and its continued isolation from much of the international community, Moscow may be reluctant to engage so deeply with the regime.
The Taliban’s pivot to Russia reflects its broader strategy of seeking international legitimacy and military modernisation. With the West no longer an option, the regime is looking to regional powers like Russia and China to support its efforts to stabilise the country and maintain control. However, this strategy also exposes the Taliban’s vulnerabilities. By relying on external partners for military assistance, the regime is acknowledging its own limitations and its dependence on foreign support.
For Russia, the calculus is more complex. Engaging with the Taliban allows Moscow to expand its influence in Central Asia and potentially mitigate the spread of instability across the region. However, the reputational risks of aligning too closely with the Taliban are significant. Russia must balance its desire to counter Western influence in the region with the potential backlash from aligning with a regime that remains a pariah on the world stage.
As the Taliban seeks to rearm and modernise its military, it faces significant challenges. While it may find a willing partner in Russia, the obstacles to securing advanced air defence systems are numerous. Russia’s own military constraints, the Taliban’s lack of technical expertise, and the logistical complexities of such a deal all suggest that any arms agreement would be slow to materialise—if it materialises at all.
In geopolitics, old enmities can give way to new alliances, but the winds of change are rarely straightforward. For now, the Taliban’s aspirations for a modern military remain just that—aspirations. Promises of support are easy to make, but the practical realities of delivering on those promises are far more difficult. As the Taliban looks to Russia for help, it faces a familiar challenge: the road to military modernisation is long, and its air defences may remain grounded for some time yet.
Tanvi Bhale is studying MSc Management at UCL and previously worked as a junior reporter at The Hans India.
