Ukraine crisis: can diplomacy prevent war?
It’s not the result Vladimir Putin would have wanted. Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary-general, said the alliance is considering sending new battlegroups to member states in south-east Europe after talks with defence ministers on Moscow’s failure to de-escalate tensions on the Ukrainian border. He added that Nato was still “prepared for dialogue”.
Putin the shapeshifter changed tone yesterday, talking of engaging in a “peaceful negotiating process”. Moscow said it was withdrawing some forces from the border and a video released by the Kremlin today appears to show tanks and military personnel leaving annexed Crimea.
European stocks rose on the news. But Ben Wallace, the defence secretary, said he had seen no evidence of withdrawal and that Russian troops are moving into “more aggressive launch areas”. Stoltenberg said he saw “no signs of de-escalation on the ground”.
If Putin doesn’t back down of his own accord, this leaves diplomatic avenues, none of which look particularly promising.
From Putin’s perspective, the big prize is still a commitment from Ukraine not to join Nato; Ukraine could reword its constitution, which enshrines the country’s ultimate goal of Nato membership, to soften its stance.
This is very unlikely. Kiev has insisted Nato membership isn’t up for negotiation, although Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK had to backpeddle on comments he made suggesting Kiev might be willing to ditch plans to join the alliance. He clarified that Kiev was willing to make concessions to avert war, just not related to Nato.
There’s been talk in recent days of Ukraine adopting neutrality, a bit like Finland, which struck a bargain with the Soviet Union at the start of the Cold War – it would remain neutral, not join Nato, and allow some Soviet influence in its domestic politics, in return for, err, not being invaded.
This would be an even bigger coup for Putin. Not only would neutrality rule out Nato membership, it would also make the goal of joining the EU (also enshrined in the constitution) much more difficult, neutering Ukrainian ambitions to lean westwards.
Then there are the failed Minsk agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015 to end the war in Ukraine, which Emmanuel Macron has said are the “only path” to peace.
Could they be revived? The big disagreement with Minsk is over how to treat Ukraine’s breakaway provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas, which the Duma, Russia’s parliament, has proposed recognising as separate countries. Kiev is prepared to grant them modest self-governance. But if reviving the accords involves accepting Russia’s position that these provinces should at least have a say over Ukraine’s foreign policy, it would amount to an internal veto on Nato membership.
It might still be possible to find common ground. While Western powers are unwilling to budge on Nato’s presence in Eastern Europe and Ukraine’s right to join Nato, it’s possible some concessions could help to allay Russian security concerns. For instance, a Nato commitment to significantly reduce its missile deployments would hand Putin a win without caving in to his demands.
The obvious point is that any meaningful concession would reward Putin for threatening a sovereign nation, proving to Moscow – and any onlookers keen to see how much ground Nato gives – that aggression and coercion pay.
