“Don’t you know there’s a war on?” A question, in relation to the Ukraine crisis, which could have been put to many countries recently. The response from some has been: “And?” But for others it has been a shocking moment requiring a reassessment of the future.
I argued recently that India’s fence-sitting was quite understandable. So is that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose members have spent the last few weeks clearing their throats, but not being able to say the word “Russia” in any of the bland statements issued by the ten-nation organisation.
ASEAN declarations are what you might expect from an EU missive if those drafting it had taken a mogadon tablet washed down with temazepam. Some members, such as Singapore, are sympathetic towards Ukraine, but not to the extent of forcing the issue with their neighbours. Vietnam, on the other hand, has good relations with the Russian arms industry, but again, it’s easier just to issue a joint statement calling for restraint without taking sides. Each country is free to take a position on its own, but as an organisation ASEAN has been supine. It’s an example of why it is hyperbole when politicians say the whole world is with Ukraine in its fight against aggression.
In March at the UN General Assembly vote, calling on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, Laos and Vietnam abstained. The junta in Myanmar later said Russia was taking “necessary action”. Outside ASEAN, Japan has shown that the concept of the industrialised democracies standing together can work. It has not only condemned Russia but enacted some sanctions against it. Yet this is a rarity in Japan’s part of the world. Practical measures against Moscow have mostly not been forthcoming.
It’s a similar story in the Middle East and Africa. “Strategic neutrality” is the name of the game for many powers – a reflection of their desire not to endanger their relationships with Russia and China over a conflict which is not directly related to their security.
The response of the Gulf nations is particularly interesting. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been lukewarm towards Washington recently and unwilling to adhere to requests to condemn Russia and increase oil and gas output to compensate for the shortages in Europe. It’s alleged that both Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed refused to take calls from President Biden on the issue. Along with many other countries in the region they don’t want to be forced to pick sides and thus fall out with either Russia and China, or the US. Just as India likes to keep Russia onside due to its UN veto on the Kashmir issue, so the Saudis and Emiratis need to curry favour with Security Council members when it comes to Iran, Syria, Yemen, and other issues.
Syria has backed Russia with President Assad going so far as to praise Putin’s invasion as a “correction of history”. Iran called for a ceasefire but blamed the US for starting the war, while Lebanon said Russia was at fault and should withdraw. However, most Arab countries simply said they were following developments with “concern”, although Oman dug deep into its diplomatic dictionary and said it viewed events with “great concern”.
In April, the UN held another vote and suspended Russia from the Human Rights Council. But only nine African countries voted for the motion, 34 sat on the fence, and 11 backed it. Authoritarian states such as Eritrea and Mali were always going to support Russia, but other countries with relatively strong democratic credentials felt they should remain neutral. Many view the Russia-Ukraine war as an argument between Europeans which does not require them to potentially harm themselves by choosing a side. They also ask why the ongoing war in Ethiopia does not receive the same degree of attention. They have a point, but the counter-argument is that Russia is – as it did in the guise of the Soviet Union – acting as an imperialist. If the African nations believe in self-determination and territorial integrity, the argument goes, they should support Ukraine.
That’s a big ask about a faraway country about which they know little and which has less investment in Africa than Russia or China. Anyway, the Europeans have hardly been falling over themselves to get involved in Ethiopia or the DRC at the expense of potential trade links. It’s when we get closer to home that the pressure grows to take a position.
Take Turkey: It was sliding out of NATO in slow motion. Moscow’s invasion has reminded Ankara of Turkey’s history with Russia and why NATO might be a good idea. President Erdogan condemned the invasion as “unlawful” and Turkey has, mostly, sided with its NATO partners.
Elsewhere, the nation state has yet again proved that reports of its imminent demise are as foolish as they were when they first began to be made decades ago amid the rise of the corporations. Poland has emerged as a key player in eastern Europe and is destined to be one of the major powers in both the EU and NATO. This means the centre of gravity in Europe is no longer as weighted towards the west as it was. Germany, after being reminded of the limits of soft power, has begun sending arms to Ukraine and will rebuild its own military. One of the issues to be sorted out in the coming years is whether President Macron tries to pull this new force into a European army, or if Germany folds its resources fully into the NATO structure.
The UK has shown that it can act unilaterally and still have influence. It was the first country to really commit to Ukraine (starting in 2015). The Dutch and Baltic States have also embraced support for Ukraine with enthusiasm. And now Finland and Sweden, both of which have abided by the EU sanctions against Russia, look as if they will soon be inside the NATO alliance. They were never as starry-eyed about Russia as was Germany, but the brutality of Putin’s illegal war of choice has shocked them into action. For solid reasons, as neutral countries, they have sat on the fence for decades. Ukraine has shown them the fence might collapse.