During the months preceding Ukraine’s long-awaited counterstrike against Russian forces, a misleading image built up in the public and journalistic mind of a spectacular El Alamein-style barrage, of shock-and-awe proportions, that would herald a general advance into enemy positions. Predictably, the reality has been very different.

Initial probing by Ukrainian forces gradually expanded into discernible “shaping operations”, designed to recalibrate localised sections of the front into a configuration more favourable to the counter-offensive. The counterattack developed almost by a process of osmosis: today it is undeniable that at least a moderate counter-offensive is in progress, though Ukraine has still not fully committed its forces and holds many units in reserve. President Zelensky regularly contradicts himself on whether or not the counter-offensive is now under way.

Patently, it is. It began badly for Ukraine, with an armoured column ambushed by Russian artillery, leading to the destruction or disabling of at least one Leopard tank. That was a bad blow to morale, with Russian propagandists triumphantly proclaiming the vulnerability of Ukraine’s much-vaunted Western armour. What was more dismaying was the circumstances in which this reverse took place: drone footage showed a column of armoured vehicles advancing, nose to tail, along a narrow road, hemmed in by minefields on either side. It was alarmingly similar to the tactical blunders made by Russian forces last year, during their ill-fated advance on Kyiv.

Since then, things have improved for Ukraine. Small, hard-won gains have been made, advancing village by village, on three sectors of the front. Bakhmut continues to be the principal killing ground: the Institute for the Study of War reports Oleksandr Shtupun, Ukrainian General Staff spokesman, claiming successful offensive operations north and north-west (where the Ukrainians appear at last to have captured the strategic high ground) of the city.

The Ukrainian attacks on Bakhmut, whose strategic insignificance experts insist on, is probably designed to damage Russian morale, if it is recaptured, and more specifically to enrage Yevgeny Progozhin, if he sees the town for which his Wagner group sacrificed 30,000 lives lost through incompetence by the regular Russian army. Consequent recriminations could sow further dissension among Ukraine’s enemies.

On two other sectors Ukraine has also made progress, advancing 3km near Mala Tokmachka, in western Zaporizhia oblast, and 7km near Velyka Novosilka, in western Donetsk oblast. The obvious target of any major Ukrainian counter-offensive would be Melitopol, whose capture would create the possibility of cutting Russian forces in two, while opening the road to Crimea.

But Russian troops are dug in behind formidable defences and while Ukraine may be able, tactically, to muster the necessary 3-1 numerical advantage required for offensive operations in localised areas, the reality is that it does not have sufficient manpower for the task it is attempting, though Ukrainian tactical creativity has achieved remarkable results already in this war.

It is far too early to predict the outcome of Ukraine’s summer campaign, but nevertheless its Western allies have to project as far ahead as possible, like chess players, to calculate the likeliest endgame. That endgame will be diplomatic rather than military – that is inevitable.

In the most optimistic outcome for Ukraine, Russian forces in the south might eventually succumb to a Kharkhiv-style rout, enabling Ukrainian forces to sweep into Crimea, leaving Russia with just one damaged bridge as access to the peninsula. That, from the Ukrainian viewpoint, is an extremely sanguine scenario. But even if it occurred, how could Ukraine expel Russia from its fastness in Donetsk, where it enjoys the support of the local population? There, the Russian army operates on interior lines, buttressed by its own national frontier.

And Vladimir Putin’s despatch of tactical nuclear weapons to his puppet state of Belarus at least signals his willingness to engage in nuclear brinkmanship if he finds himself in a tight corner. The problem for the West is its cultural incomprehension of the Russian mind. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine harped back to the playbooks of Peter and Catherine the Great. Russia built its empire through sustaining a more or less permanent state of war. Russia is inured to long wars: they are part of its culture.

The West, in contrast, and notably America, has a notoriously short attention span. Every American engagement, if it proves costly and tedious, ends in withdrawal – a tradition that began with Vietnam and was reiterated in Afghanistan. If supply chains are compromised, Wall Street disgruntled, or instinctively isolationist Joe Public grows discontented, America will decamp. Fortunately, the United States is not militarily engaged in this war, so may display more staying power; but America is an inconstant ally, with its own priorities to serve.

NATO has problems too, with the recent re-election of Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. Strengthened by that victory, which Western media’s wishful thinking had projected as unlikely when, to realistic observers, it was virtually inevitable, Erdoğan has raised the stakes over his veto on Sweden joining NATO. He is demanding that Sweden extradite named opponents before he lifts his veto on that country’s admission to the alliance.

Erdoğan intends to exploit his power to the full. He is being criticised by many in the West for his supposed closeness to Russia. In fact, he is playing realpolitik in his country’s interests and has actually proved himself useful as an honest broker by helping to negotiate the unblocking of Ukrainian grain supplies by sea. In the unknown endgame of the Ukrainian war he could again be a useful intermediary. The bottom line is: Turkey is a NATO member, in an organisation that has no mechanism for expulsion.

The West suffers from the disadvantage of fragmentation. The EU, another piece in the Ukraine jigsaw, has had a very bad war. Its continued persecution of Poland and Hungary, for such derelictions as refusing to receive large numbers of non-European migrants, ignores the strategic significance of both countries, particularly Poland, which some geopolitical experts forecast could become the leading power in eastern Europe – as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was historically – presenting a crucial barrier to Russian expansionist ambitions.

In contrast, Vladimir Putin only has to keep one country on side: China. Nor is he bereft of partners, if not quite allies, elsewhere. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is expanding trade links between Moscow and Abu Dhabi, with the UAE helping to negotiate the release of Russian prisoners of war in Ukraine. The UAE has not implemented sanctions against Russia and was prominent at Putin’s recent economic forum in St Petersburg.

While Russia and Saudi Arabia are in conflict over oil, with Putin’s liberal supply policy undermining Saudi attempts to raise prices, seven sanctioned Russian arms companies displayed their wares at a recent trade fair in Riyadh. Elsewhere in the world, instinctive hostility to American hegemony plays into Russia’s hands. America’s crass crusade, begun under the Obama administration, to tie aid to African countries to compliance with requirements which are resented as neo-colonialism, has alienated many nations on that continent.

Most significantly, African states have now launched a peace initiative in the Ukraine war. They have a dog in this fight, since Africa, from which the spectre of famine is never long absent, is concerned about disruption of grain supplies and other supply chain issues.

A delegation of leaders from South Africa, Senegal, the Comoros and Egypt is in Kyiv for talks with President Zelensky. During their visit the city has been bombarded by Russia with hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, presumably in an attempt to demonstrate to them the awesomeness of Moscow’s military might. If so, that impression may have been diluted by the ease with which they were shot down.

The African delegation will travel on to St Petersburg to meet Vladimir Putin on Saturday. It is unlikely it will exert any significant diplomatic heft in either country, but it is nevertheless an important development. At a time of geopolitical fragmentation, African nations are confronting European leaders with their needs, in a shrinking world. It is unlikely to be the last African intervention and it opens up yet another possible channel for conflict resolution, an activity in which African countries, due to the turbulent nature of their post-colonial history, have considerable expertise.

Realistically, any ambition for regime change in Russia must be excised from Western policy: it was a Western-sponsored regime change in Ukraine in 2014 that initially triggered the crisis. We may have to negotiate with Putin, so Western absolutists need to get over it. We are dealing with a nuclear power, controlled by a man of uncertain temperament. In the greatest East-West confrontation in history, President Kennedy stood firm against the Soviet Union on Cuba in 1962, but always left Nikita Khrushchev a window of opportunity for saving face while conceding.

If the Ukrainian offensive succeeds, public opinion will applaud, but recognise the impracticality of expelling Russia from every square inch of Ukrainian territory, as Zelensky demands, especially where local populations are pro-Russian. If it fails, the appetite of Western populations for endless war will quickly fade. Western leaders must be vigilantly poised to seize any moment that offers an opportunity for hard-nosed diplomacy, rather than continuing to herd Ukrainian and Russian youths into the meat grinder that has already devoured too many lives.

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