In his 1998 book, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System, Peter Wesley-Smith, the former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong, wrote:
“At bottom, law is dependent upon politics. In one sense it is a rationalisation of a political event, a transformation of a state of affairs brought by force into a situation governed by law. The constitution reflects and sustains victory on the field of battle. It is, nevertheless, legitimate, for it is in fact obeyed and accepted as such by most of the Regime’s inhabitants.”
Wesley-Smith touched on something of fundamental importance to our political life in Hong Kong – we, like the world’s liberal democracies, believe in government by the consent of the governed. When the organs of governance and law enforcement have lost their legitimacy and the trust among a significant proportion of the population, it becomes extremely difficult for them to implement even the simplest of policies – not to mention a law which is seemingly against the values the population believe in.
Beijing knows that it will never command such legitimacy. That is why the Chinese government has finally decided to act on its own, without consent and without consultation. In a new draft law, whose extended title is “on establishing and improving the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to safeguard national security”, Beijing is seeking to allow its own national security organs to set up agencies in Hong Kong.
It will also allow the Chinese government to legislate, unilaterally and bypassing Hong Kong’s own legislature, to stop activities in four areas – namely any acts deemed to “split the country, subvert state power, organize and carry out terrorist activities” and to “interfere” with Hong Kong affairs by “foreign and external forces”.
Under the new draft law’s stipulations, the territory’s Chief Executive must also report regularly to Beijing on matters relating to national security.
The global health crisis through which we are now living has disrupted the political landscape once again. The crucial effect of Covid-19 on the political situation is twofold. First, the pandemic prevents protesters in Hong Kong from gathering in huge masses – although it is still likely that they will continue to take to the streets anyway. Second, Sino-US relations have sharply deteriorated – Beijing is likely to benefit from being the first-mover, manoeuvring quickly to enact the national security law.
Words failed me when my friend asked me how I felt about this unprecedented move. These feelings never come together in just a single day or following a single event – it made me look back and recount what my sentiments were at different “milestones” that shaped Hong Kong into what it is today.
We have been where we are now before. In 2003, the then Hong Kong government proposed the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, one which would require the island’s administration to fulfil the obligations set by Article 23 of the Basic Law, the territory’s de facto constitution. The Article in the Basic Law requires Hong Kong to legislate on its own to ban any act of “treason, secession, sedition and subversion” against the Regime.
The word “subversion” was at first removed from the Article, but it was reintroduced following the Tiananmen protests of June 1989, during which some one million Hong Kong citizens went onto the streets to protest for democracy, the day after a major typhoon struck the city of Hong Kong. Ever since, this Article has proven to be a crucial flashpoint of controversy between those supporting democracy in Hong Kong and those promoting closer ties with Beijing’s authoritarian system. “Subversion” can be interpreted in many different ways.
The proposed security legislation in 2003 caused considerable controversy and triggered a massive demonstration, consisting of half a million people, in the city on July 1. Two months later, the Bill was withdrawn by the then Chief Executive.
Even as a kid, I was in awe at the power of the ordinary people of Hong Kong in unity, as showcased through peaceful, non-violent demonstrations. I have felt the same power on June 4 every year since, at Victoria Park, where hundreds of thousands of Hongkongers light up their candles and reaffirm their determination to bring democracy to China. What I didn’t realise, at that time, was that Article 23 had always been there, and the matter had to be resolved sooner or later whether by deliberation or by coercion.
Just over ten years later, in 2014, Hong Kong once again impressed the world with peaceful civil disobedience against the proposed changes to the electoral system. This would have limited those capable of voting for representatives of the city’s Chief Executive. The protest gained its name, the Umbrella Movement, from the use of umbrellas to protect oneself from the pepper sprays by the police. The use of teargas against the protesters was a direct provocation for many to go onto the major highways and begin an 80-day long occupation.
To me, the occupation area was a political utopia without the disturbance of power and the tides fortune which exist in real-world politics. Of course, the movement was short-lived, but through the protests we reaffirmed our beliefs in democracy, freedom and equality.
The introduction of the so-called Extradition Bill in 2019 has caused the gravest damage not only to the long-cherished values of our city and to the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, but also to almost every aspect of the economy and society. It has also made Beijing even more determined to tackle unrest with whatever means possible, including new and ever more punitive legislation.
As a medical student, I find that the most appropriate analogy for the unrest since last June is – an infection. The bill posed threats directly to the rule of law, the freedoms that citizens enjoy, and to economic activities by inciting fear – much like the pathogen that directly damages different organ systems. The protesters resisted these threats with determination and with different degrees of violence – like our immune system. The bill was then withdrawn following months of protests and clashes, but the failure of the government to respond to the demands from the protesters has led to persistent protests and clashes which themselves have mutilated all facets of the Hong Kong society – much like the hyper-inflammatory status and the cytokine storm caused by our immune cells.
I am empathetic towards the protesters regardless of the violence they have used – there were no other possible ways to change the government’s mind. The government must be held accountable for introducing the Bill and the police for inappropriate use of force.
But who should be responsible for the damage to the public facilities and normal socioeconomic order, the desecration of the rule of law, the disrespect or even physical attacks towards people with diverse political stances (especially towards those from the mainland)? How can we count the cost for the harm done to every one of us psychologically, when violent clashes filled our TVs, newspapers and our smartphones every day? I cannot find an objective and impartial answer for myself – and I was torn by these questions on a daily basis.
In any case, it is now certain that China’s parliament will pass the draft security Bill into law on May 28. So, what am I concerned about?
In 2015, the world was shocked by the sudden disappearances of five employees of Causeway Bay Books, one of whom, Lee Bo, disappeared within Hong Kong itself. The bookshop was notable for selling political books that were deemed “a threat to national security” and hence were banned in China. Will disappearances like this become normal, once Beijing’s national security agency reaches Hong Kong? Will people be arrested on June 4 memorials, commemorating the Tiananmen Square massacres, simply because they call for an end to the Communist Party dictatorship?
The legislature in Beijing will be able to enact national security laws circumventing the Legislative Council in Hong Kong. The laws of mainland China are known for their ambiguity and room for (potentially very wide) interpretation. Without the scrutiny by the local legislature, the enacted law will most probably be much worse even than the bill proposed in 2003.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for Hong Kong’s citizens themselves to demand the reversal of Beijing’s decision. The Umbrella Movement in 2014 terminated the electoral reform itself, certainly, but Beijing’s resolve that future reforms will come, by coercion if not by consultation, remains in force. It has always been a matter of if and not when.
What can we do about it then? During the anti-extradition protests last year, a worrying number of protesters had come up with the “philosophy” that goes “if we burn, you burn with us” – much like a scorched-earth strategy, a guarantee of mutual destruction. Defending the freedoms and values of Hong Kong is not a stage for revolutionary heroism.
Perhaps the international community may press China with all possible means (especially economic) without causing harm to the lives of ordinary Hongkongers. Some have even suggested that Donald Trump’s White House should remove the special socioeconomic status of Hong Kong established in the United States–Hong Kong Policy Act as a “retaliation” against the regime and to China’s economy. But this is both myopic and, frankly, rather childish: Beijing must have considered such move as a worst-case scenario before going ahead; and it is the ordinary citizens in Hong Kong that will suffer the most if the US treats Hong Kong the same as the Mainland.
Sadly, most of the pressure placed on China from the international community is transient and remains at the verbal level, in part because Hong Kong is of decreasing importance as a middleman between China and the West in trade; and also because Hong Kong, along with its future, has long been a bargaining chip on the gaming table between the two superpowers.
What has happened since last June, and more recently last week, has caused me constant bewilderment – what has gone wrong with Hong Kong? As my friend and I were sharing remorse and sighs, I started to recall what Lee Kuan Yew said in an interview when he visited Hong Kong in 1992:
“[I]f…democracy plus free market produces a prosperous Hong Kong, then that is a challenge to [China’s] system…China will not tolerate a Hong Kong which is made into a separate community or society from China. Once you have separate elections to identify separate group interests, you create a distinct identity separate from the mainland…
Why have they agreed [to preserve Hong Kong’s way of life for 50 years]? Because they think Hong Kong is a superior model? No. They have agreed because economically Hong Kong is of value to them…Put it in another way, after 50 years, do you think the Chinese will allow Hong Kong to be different from Guangdong?”
Much to my regret and sadness, Lee Kuan Yew was right.
The author is a former pro-democracy activist from Hong Kong and is now a medical student in the United States.