Almost four years since the military seized power from Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government in a violent coup, a political crisis continues to engulf Myanmar.
The military regime that replaced Suu Kyi’s government in February 2021 currently controls less than half of the country, thanks to the fierce resistance it faces across Myanmar from numerous ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).
Last week, for the second time in two months, Min Aung Hlaing, leader of the military which is also known as the Tatmadaw, invited the country’s 21 largest EAOs to join peace talks to bring the bloody civil war to a conclusion. So far, no ethnic militias have responded.
China is the most influential international player in Myanmar and it is desperate to remain indispensable in Myanmar’s peace process. However its competing interests in the region risk prolonging the conflict.
Myanmar’s idiosyncratic ethnic armed groups each claim to represent significant portions of society. Ethnic minority groups, which make up around 30-40% of Myanmar’s population, have faced brutal repression from consecutive Burmese administrations since independence in 1948, leading many to take up arms against the state.
To complicate matters further, the diverse array of actors opposing the Tatmadaw’s rule is not limited to groups who comprise the country’s various EAOs. Other militia groups, such as communally organised People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), some of whom align with the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile led by officials who served under Suu Kyi, have also taken up arms against the junta.
Since October 2023, fighting has only intensified after various armed ethnic groups joined forces to form a coalition, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
International powers observing the situation on the ground have not been united in their reaction or foreign policy approach to Myanmar. While western countries, including the US and UK, have condemned the military regime and imposed sanctions on it, other powers such as Russia and Thailand have restrained from publicly criticising the junta with the former providing US$406 million worth of arms shipments to the Tatmadaw according to the UN.
China is the most influential global player in Myanmar due to its geographic proximity, economic strength and political prestige. However it has adopted a strategically ambiguous approach which appears riven with contradictions.
On the one hand, China has provided vital economic, military and diplomatic support for Min Aung Hlaing’s regime, effectively enabling the junta to cling on. On the other, Beijing has directly financed or supplied armaments to numerous EAOs that refuse to recognise the military’s authority, while also maintaining contacts within the NUG.
All the while, large Chinese state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and private firms have heavily invested in infrastructure and agribusiness projects in Myanmar especially in the northwestern highlands close to the border with China’s southeastern Yunnan province.
This multi-faceted approach is driven by a number of complex geopolitical considerations. The first being Beijing’s goal of expanding its influence in Southeast Asia while also maintaining stability along its western borders and preventing refugees from flooding into Yunnan.
America’s vocal opposition to Myanmar’s junta has also concerned Chinese officials. These fears have remained heightened since President Biden signed the BURMA ACT in law in December 2022 which placed further economic and diplomatic restrictions upon the SAC whilst guaranteeing around US$450 million of non-lethal assistance for civil society groups in Myanmar including the NUG and certain PDFs.
As Enze Han, author of Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland State Building between China and Southeast Asia notes, the possibility (however unlikely) of the US brokering peace talks in Myanmar has caused “tremendous anxiety” in Beijing, with China keen to remain “indispensable in Myanmar’s peace process”.
In an attempt to rebuff any American encroachment in Myanmar, and conscious that its support for the military has antagonised domestic opponents to the regime, Beijing has sought to cement its influence amongst loyal ethnic militias as well as the junta in an effort to maintain a presence on the ground.
Equally concerning to Beijing are ostensibly non-aligned organised crime syndicates in Myanmar which operate in the country’s borderlands. Cyber scam operations perpetrated by these criminal groups have extensively targeted Chinese citizens and are viewed as a significant threat to Chinese national security. So much so that Beijing’s initial tacit endorsement of the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s offensive last year seemed to be motivated by China’s frustration with the junta’s inability or reluctance to clamp down on these criminal groups even after the death of over 60 Chinese citizens at a cybercrime centre in October 2023.
In addition to these geopolitical concerns, economic interests are also central to China’s strategy in the country with Beijing heavily invested in large-scale infrastructure projects across Myanmar under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.
These costly Chinese-financed projects include the US$1.5 billion oil and the US$1.04 billion natural gas pipelines stretching from China’s westerly Yunnan Province to Myanmar’s port of Kyaukphya in the Indian Ocean as well as power plants such as the US$2.5 billion Mee Lin Gyaing site. The pipelines in particular are a key part of Beijing’s strategic attempts to strengthen its energy security. They provide an alternative transportation route to the potentially vulnerable Malacca Strait which the vast majority of Chinese oil and gas imports currently flow through but could theoretically be cut off by the US in the event of conflict between the two superpowers.
Given that China’s expensive ventures extend across Burmese territory controlled by both the Tatmadaw and EAOs, Beijing must handle its relations with all these parties very carefully. Especially since numerous Chinese state actors such as the Yunnan provincial government and a number of SOEs maintain deep trade ties across the border.
Thus, China’s competing strategic interests in Myanmar have ultimately locked Beijing into a hedging strategy where it keeps the junta afloat while simultaneously working hard to ensure that its allied ethnic militias are not defeated by the Tatmadaw.
According to Han’s predictions, Beijing is likely to play a “pivotal” role in Myanmar’s peace process. But, as the almost four-year-old conflict staggers on, and the junta’s hold over the country continues to weaken in the face of mounting pressure, China’s attempts to appease all of the country’s competing factions at once could become increasingly difficult.
Sooner or later, it may have to pick a side.
